Florida State University Law Review
Volume 40

Issue 3

2013

Disclosing Corporate Disclosure Policies
Victoria Schwartz
Pepperdine University School of Law, 123@456.com

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Victoria Schwartz, Disclosing Corporate Disclosure Policies, 40 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 487 (2013) .
https://ir.law.fsu.edu/lr/vol40/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Florida State University Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact efarrell@law.fsu.edu.

Article 2

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
LAW REVIEW

DISCLOSING CORPORATE DISCLOSURE POLICIES
Victoria Schwartz

VOLUME 40

SPRING 2013

NUMBER 3

Recommended citation: Victoria Schwartz, Disclosing Corporate Disclosure Policies, 40 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 487 (2013).

DISCLOSING CORPORATE DISCLOSURE POLICIES
VICTORIA SCHWARTZ
ABSTRACT
Between Steve Jobs’ diagnosis of pancreatic cancer in 2003 and his death in 2011, Apple
struggled to respect the privacy of its CEO while disclosing relevant information to its
shareholders. The existing rules that govern corporate disclosure were of little help. They
offer no mechanism for taking into account privacy considerations; nor do they provide any
clear guidance regarding whether, when, and under what circumstances a corporation must
disclose personal information about its executives. Existing privacy laws also fail to comprehensively address this problem. This legal void has created widespread uncertainty for
executives, corporations, and shareholders. Scholars have also struggled to identify solutions that appropriately account for both privacy and disclosure. Their attempts have been
hindered by the difficulty of estimating the respective values of disclosure to investors and of
privacy to executives, especially to the extent that the value of privacy varies widely across
individuals and depends on the type of personal information.
This Article offers one solution for accounting for this privacy-disclosure problem. First,
corporations and executives should contract for a disclosure policy that takes into consideration the individual executive’s privacy preferences. The corporation should then be required
to disclose the contracted-for disclosure policy to its shareholders. The use of a contractual
menu approach would allow for the possibility of executives’ heterogeneous privacy preferences, while minimizing transaction and other costs of traditional default rules. At the same
time, disclosure of the policy allows shareholders to indirectly exert influence on the corporation’s negotiations. In addition, the creation and disclosure of the disclosure policy increases
certainty for all the parties involved.
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I. INTRODUCTION
When Apple CEO Steve Jobs was diagnosed with pancreatic cancer in 2003, after much agonizing, Apple’s board decided to say nothing to its shareholders.1 And as Jobs’ health deteriorated, Apple continued to cite Jobs’ need for privacy, and offered little to no information about his condition.2 By contrast, when Warren Buffett underwent colon surgery in 2000, Berkshire Hathaway provided a detailed press release before the surgery informing shareholders that
Buffett expected to have the surgery and the circumstances that led
to the surgery.3
These salient health examples are not unique. Torn between respecting executive privacy and meeting obligations to shareholders,
corporations lack guidance for whether and under what circumstances they should disclose personal information about their executives to
their shareholders.4 And commentators, practitioners, and scholars
continue to debate the doctrinal and positive question of when disclosure is required under the existing legal system.5

1. Cory Franklin, Does a CEO Deserve Privacy?, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 27,
2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-10-27/news/ct-perspec-1027-ceo-20111027_1_
apple-shareholders-apple-board-apple-stock; Joe Nocera, Apple’s Culture of Secrecy, N.Y.
TIMES (July 26, 2008), http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/26/business/26nocera.html?
sq=&st=nyt&scp=170&pagewanted=all.
2. Nocera, supra note 1.
3. See ALICE SCHROEDER, THE SNOWBALL: WARREN BUFFETT AND THE BUSINESS OF
LIFE 700-01 (2008).
4. See infra Part II.B.
5. Joan MacLeod Heminway, Personal Facts About Executive Officers: A Proposal for
Tailored Disclosures to Encourage Reasonable Investor Behavior, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
749, 752-59 (2007) ( “[T]he gap-filling rules may require public disclosure of executives’
personal facts.” Under the antifraud rules “a court may find that it is substantially likely
that a reasonable investor would consider certain personal facts important in making an
investment decision relating to the corporation’s securities. . . . [or] as a significant alteration of the total mix of available information.” (emphasis added)); Alexis Brown Stokes,
An Apple a Day Keeps Shareholder Suits at Bay: An Examination of a Corporate Officer’s
Legal Duty to Disclose Health Problems to Shareholders, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 303,
310 (2011) (recognizing that there is “uncertainty over whether and when an executive’s
medical condition is ‘material’ to the company”); Chris Dolmetsch & Peter Burrows, Apple
May Not Need to Disclosure Details of Jobs Medical Leave, Lawyers Say, BLOOMBERG (Jan.
18, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-18/apple-s-disclosure-of-steve-jobsmedical-leave-is-sufficient-lawyers-say.html; Nocera, supra note 1.
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This Article addresses the related prescriptive question of when a
corporation should be required to disclose personal information about
its executives to its shareholders in light of a privacy-disclosure problem—conflicting interests in executive privacy and shareholder disclosure pulling in opposing policy directions. This privacy-disclosure
problem exists at the intersection of two Brandeisian-inspired legal
ideas. Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren’s 1890 article “The Right
to Privacy,” arguing for legal recognition of a right to privacy,6 is
widely considered the founding architecture for privacy law and
scholarship.7 At the same time, Brandeis’ famous quotation that
“[p]ublicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
diseases” and that “[s]unlight is said to be the best of disinfectants;
electric light the most efficient policeman,”8 is commonly recognized
in the corporate disclosure literature as part of the founding legal
theory for the value of disclosure, which influenced thinking about
corporate disclosure regimes.9
The privacy-disclosure problem occurs as the result of a tension
between two sets of competing interests. On the one hand, shareholders have a legitimate interest in disclosure of personal information about an executive that either impacts the ability of the executive to currently perform his or her duties, or is likely to impact the
executive’s ability to perform his or her duties in the future. On the
other hand, executives have a legitimate privacy interest in their personal information. Additionally, evidence suggests that individual privacy preferences are heterogeneous.10 The resulting difficulty in determining the strengths, valuations, and distribution of privacy preferences makes developing a solution that correctly accounts for the competing privacy and disclosure interests particularly challenging.

6. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.
193 (1890).
7. See, e.g., James H. Barron, Warren and Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L.
Rev. 193 (1890): Demystifying a Landmark Citation, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 875, 877 (1979)
(noting the “near unanimity among courts and commentators that the Warren-Brandeis
conceptualization created the structural and jurisprudential foundation of the tort of invasion of privacy”); Irwin R. Kramer, The Birth of Privacy Law: A Century Since Warren and
Brandeis, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 703, 704 (1990).
8. LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY AND HOW THE BANKERS USE IT 92 (1914).
9. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1197, 1212-15 (1999) (describing Brandeis’
role as an “advocate of disclosure” and his influence on the players involved in writing the
Securities Act).
10. See Il-Horn Hann et al., The Value of Online Information Privacy: An
Empirical Investigation 3 (Oct. 2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://regulation2point0.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2010/04/php2b.pdf; Alan F.
Westin, “Whatever Works”: The American Public’s Attitudes Toward Regulation and
Self-Regulation on Consumer Privacy Issues, NAT’L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN.,
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/page/chapter-1-theory-markets-and-privacy (last visited May 14,
2013); infra Part II.A.
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Furthermore, the privacy-disclosure problem extends beyond the
disclosure of health information context, although that is the situation that often arises in the news and therefore in the public consciousness. Analogous problems involving tensions between privacy
and disclosure may be triggered by various types of personal information—including a messy divorce, extramarital affairs, legal difficulties, addictions, and various problems with a child—all of which
may impact the executive’s performance in some manner.
This Article offers one possible solution for addressing the privacydisclosure problem.11 Under this proposal, individual corporations
would contract with their high-level executives to determine the privacy disclosure policy that would apply to that executive’s personal
information in light of that executive’s privacy preferences. The corporation would then be required to disclose that negotiated disclosure
policy to its shareholders. By harnessing market forces, this solution
accounts for the differences in individual privacy preferences, while
providing a mechanism to respect both sets of competing interests.
This solution allows executives to negotiate a disclosure policy that
matches their personal privacy preferences. At the same time, the
disclosure of that negotiated disclosure policy would still provide
additional decisionmaking information to shareholders to use in their
investment decisions.
The Article develops these ideas in four parts. Part II offers a theoretical account of the competing interests at stake in the problem
building upon both the existing privacy and disclosure literatures. It
then addresses the evidence suggesting the existence of heterogeneous privacy preferences and the additional challenges such heterogeneity creates. Part II also identifies the insufficiencies of existing legal regimes in dealing with these competing interests and the resulting real world uncertainty in the corporate world. Part III introduces
the details of the proposed solution and explains the benefits of using
a contract menu approach. Part IV considers the applicability of the

11. Others have previously discussed this privacy-disclosure problem in different contexts. See Patricia Sánchez Abril & Ann M. Olazábal, The Celebrity CEO: Corporate Disclosure at the Intersection of Privacy and Securities Law, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1545, 1581-96
(2010) (discussing disclosure obligations under SEC regulations and federal antifraud
laws); Heminway, supra note 5, at 789-802 (2007) (recommending reforms relating to disclosure of personal information about executives); Allan Horwich, When the Corporate Luminary Becomes Seriously Ill: When Is a Corporation Obligated to Disclose That Illness and
Should the Securities and Exchange Commission Adopt a Rule Requiring Disclosure?, 5
N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 827, 833-62 (2009) (addressing primarily the descriptive question of
what the law currently requires); Tom C.W. Lin, Executive Trade Secrets, 87 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 911, 951-70 (2012) [hereinafter Lin, Executive] (proposing importing the trade secret regime as a useful theoretical framework for treatment of executive disclosures); Tom
C.W. Lin, Undressing the CEO: Disclosing Private, Material Matters of Public Company
Executives, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 383, 409-16 (2009) [hereinafter Lin, Undressing the CEO]
(offering a model for disclosure of private executive information).
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proposed solution to other areas of the law including consumer privacy and the disclosure of information about politicians and candidates
for office, and explains how examining those contexts reinforces that
this solution is specifically tailored to the particular problem of corporate executives. Part V concludes.
II. TENSION BETWEEN PRIVACY AND DISCLOSURE
In deciding whether corporations should have to disclose personal
information about corporate executives to the corporation’s shareholders, policymakers must account for privacy and disclosure interests pulling in competing directions. The shareholder interests pull in
the direction of more disclosure, whereas the executive privacy interests pull in the direction of less. This section builds on the existing
corporate disclosure and privacy literatures to identify these competing interests and explain why they are triggered in the context of this
particular problem. It then turns to a discussion of the legal status
quo, with regard to both the corporate disclosure rules and various
privacy laws, in order to explain the shortcomings of this patchwork
of laws for thinking about the problem. The status quo neither accounts for both sets of competing interests nor for the added difficulty
posed by evidence of heterogeneity in privacy preferences. Consequently, executives, shareholders, and corporations all currently operate within a regime of uncertainty.
A. The Disclosure Interest
The securities regulatory regime in the United States is unquestionably a disclosure regime. Furthermore, it seems fair to assume
that the existing overall disclosure regime is likely to remain intact
for the foreseeable future. Nonetheless, in order to better appreciate
the specific disclosure interest in the disclosure of personal executive
information, it is helpful to briefly describe the rationales for the
overall disclosure system, while recognizing the long-lasting debate
regarding the overall merits of such a regime. Only then is it possible
to identify the theory under which there is a legitimate interest in
the disclosure of personal information about executives. To be clear,
the question at this point in the analysis is whether there is an interest in, or a value to, disclosure itself. This is distinct from the question of whether disclosure makes sense as a policy; that question involves both the consideration of costs and benefits of a disclosure policy as well as comparisons to alternative policy options.
The legal, economic, accounting, and finance literatures addressing disclosure have not identified a single comprehensive theory of
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disclosure.12 Although they draw lines in different ways, scholars defending the existing system of corporate disclosure have identified its
underlying rationale as some combination of intersecting justifications: (1) preventing financial manipulation/fraud because “sunlight
is said to be the best of disinfectants”; (2) providing investors with
enough information to enable them to arrive at their own rational
decisions; (3) fairness/equality: allowing all investors, big and small,
insiders and outsiders, equal access to relevant information; (4) restoring the confidence of investors in the stock market; and (5) causing stock prices to better reflect underlying firm value and therefore
enhance market accuracy.13 At the same time, critics have challenged
these justifications on numerous theoretical14 and empirical grounds.15
12. See, e.g., Robert E. Verrecchia, Essays on Disclosure, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 97, 98 (2001).
13. I draw these lines slightly different from others, but draw upon their categories.
See Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure System,
9 J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (1983) (describing the benefits of mandatory disclosure as (1) preventing
issuers from concealing or misrepresenting information material to investment decisions;
(2) preventing underwriting costs and insiders’ salaries and perquisites from becoming
excessive; (3) increasing “public confidence” in the markets; (4) supplementing suboptimal
disclosure under state law and private associations; and (5) supplementing suboptimal
disclosure under civil and criminal actions); see also Geoffrey A. Manne, The Hydraulic
Theory of Disclosure Regulation and Other Costs of Disclosure, 58 ALA. L. REV. 473, 479-80,
480 n.25 (2007) (offering three categories and suggesting that Seligman’s categories can be
collapsed into his three: (1) investors will make better investment decisions; (2) stock prices
will better reflect underlying firm value thereby enhancing market accuracy; and (3) fraud
will be deterred).
14. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 692-96 (1984); Edmund W. Kitch, The Theory
and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 770-72 (1995).
15. In 1964, George Stigler provided the first systematic criticism of corporate disclosure requirements. George J. Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Market, 37 J. BUS.
117 (1964). Among his many arguments, Stigler attempted to empirically determine
whether investors in new stock issues had benefitted from mandatory disclosure requirements. See id. at 120. Stigler concluded that the mandatory disclosure requirements “had
no important effect on the quality of new securities sold to the public.” Id. at 124.
Almost immediately, Irwin Friend and Edward Herman challenged the accuracy of
Stigler’s data, as well as the conclusions he had drawn from his findings. See Irwin Friend
& Edward S. Herman, The S.E.C. Through a Glass Darkly, 37 J. BUS. 382 (1964). Friend
and Herman found that correcting for these deficiencies confirmed the superiority of postS.E.C. performance. See id. at 391-99. This led to another round of exchanges between
Stigler and his critics. See George J. Stigler, Comment, 37 J. BUS. 414 (1964) (defending his
conclusions, while acknowledging errors in the original data); Irwin Friend & Edward S.
Herman, Professor Stigler on Securities Regulation: A Further Comment, 38 J. BUS. 106
(1965) (claiming that even with Stigler’s revisions, the evidence still strongly favors superior new issue performance in the post-S.E.C. period).
A decade later, George Benston advanced three arguments for concluding that mandatory disclosure was unnecessary: (1) a historical critique: he found little evidence of
fraud or misrepresentation prior to 1933; (2) a necessity critique: corporate voluntary disclosures prior to 1934 provided investors with adequate material financial information to
make informed investment decisions; and (3) an empirical critique based on tests demonstrating that the corporate disclosures compelled by the SEC were neither timely nor material to investors. George J. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 132 (1973). Like Stigler’s,
Benston’s studies and the conclusions he drew from them have drawn extensive criticisms.
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Relatedly, theoretical economic models suggest that investors value
disclosure requirements because such disclosure causes managers to
better prioritize maximizing shareholder value, and some empirical
evidence supports this conclusion.16 The evidence from empirical and
theoretical attempts to demonstrate or disprove the effectiveness of
disclosure remains mixed,17 and a clear answer remains elusive.18
Despite this uncertainty, consistent with the majority view as well
as with the existing disclosure regime, this Article assumes that
there is some value to shareholders from the disclosure of certain
types of relevant information. At the most basic level, shareholders
value the disclosure of relevant information because shareholders
always want to be able to sell their stock for the highest price possible.19 Their ability to command the highest possible price relies on a
flow of believable information from the corporation, which prevents
potential buyers from reducing their bid prices because they assume
the worst.20 Shareholders want positive information to be disclosed in
order to raise the stock price directly. Shareholders want negative
information to be disclosed in order to increase the believability of
the flow of information, and because without the disclosure of bad
information, buyers may assume that silence is evidence of catastrophic information, thus reducing the share price.

See, e.g., Irwin Friend & Randolph Westerfield, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market:
Comment, 65 AM. ECON. REV. 467, 467-68 (1975) (noting that the conclusions Benston
“draws from his analysis seem faulty”); Seligman, supra note 13, at 14-18 (criticizing
Benston’s historical critique as being based on an incomplete search of the literature; his
voluntary disclosure argument as based on an incomplete sample and failing to support his
overall conclusions; his empirical critique as based on a faulty tests, which have been heavily criticized for both study design and interpretation of results; and all of his critiques as
objectionable because they ignore historical evidence supporting disclosure).
16. See Michael Greenstone, Paul Oyer & Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, Mandated Disclosure, Stock Returns, and the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments, 2006 Q. J. ECON. 399, 403.
17. See, e.g., Greenstone, Oyer & Vissing-Jorgensen, supra note 16, at 446-47 (finding
evidence that investors valued the additional disclosure requirements in the 1964 Securities Acts Amendments); Gregg A. Jarrell, The Economic Effects of Federal Regulation of the
Market for New Security Issues, 24 J.L. & ECON. 613, 624-50 (1981); Rafael La Porta et al.,
What Works in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1, 27-28 (2006) (concluding that mandatory
disclosure rules improve stock market performance); Carol J. Simon, The Effect of the 1933
Securities Act on Investor Information and the Performance of New Issues, 79 AM. ECON.
REV. 295, 313 (1989) (finding a benefit from mandatory disclosure on unseasoned, nonNYSE-traded firms, but not seasoned NYSE-traded firms). See also Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 14, at 672 (concluding that “neither the supporters nor the opponents of the
fraud and disclosure rules have made a very good case.”).
18. Jonathan R. Macey, Efficient Capital Markets, Corporate Disclosure, and Enron,
89 CORNELL L. REV. 394, 411-12 (2004) (noting that existing “empirical economic studies
provide no more than weak support for mandatory disclosure” and that “the case for mandatory disclosure remains indeterminate”); See Manne, supra note 13, at 474 n.3 (pointing
out that “evidence of the efficacy of mandatory disclosure is also ambiguous”).
19. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 684.
20. Id.
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Therefore, the key question is why personal information about executives constitutes the sort of relevant information whose disclosure
shareholders value. Some scholars have attempted to minimize the
legitimacy of the interest in personal information about executives as
an example of celebrity-fascination, and therefore not something that
society or lawmakers should prioritize.21 While celebrity-fascination
may be a portion of the picture, other under-theorized explanations
exist for why shareholders might want to know personal information
about executives.
First, shareholders might legitimately care about personal information regarding executives, which provides some insight into the
ability of the executive to do his or her job. This category may be divided into concerns about an executive’s ability to currently perform
the job, and concerns about the executive’s ability to stay on the job.
In the first scenario, shareholders might care about personal information that in some way may impact the ability of the executive to
do his or her job. In this scenario, the personal fact is not signaling to
the shareholder that the executive will leave the current role, but
rather that the executive’s effectiveness in that role is impacted perhaps because the personal fact represents some sort of distraction or
other inability to devote the executive’s typical time, energy, or focus
to the company. This scrutiny of the ability of the executive to do his
or her job does not rely on an assumption that the executive singlehandedly affects corporate performance.22 The executive is not strictly speaking “indispensable,” and there is probably, as others have
argued, an overly exaggerated cult of the CEO.23 It is not, however,
necessary for the executive to single-handedly affect corporate performance for information about the executive to be relevant to the
shareholder, because it can impact the executive’s performance and
therefore the performance of the company.
Various personal facts about the executive might trigger this concern about the executive’s ability to perform his or her job. For example, an executive who is in the middle of a nasty divorce might find
the divorce to be a significant distraction from his or her duties. Similarly, non-terminal health issues might impact the ability of an executive to do his or her job, even if shy of requiring the executive to actually leave the job. For example, a particular health issue may cause
time away from the job because of time required to attend doctor appointments or to deal with treatment. Alternatively, various health
issues may involve symptoms that impact job performance, such as
severe headaches, physical weakness, or various mental health issues.
21. Abril & Olazábal, supra note 11, at 1547-50.
22. But see id. at 1602-03 (identifying this as a fallacy by those who believe that corporate information can impact the company).
23. See id.
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In some situations, such as the death of a family member, empirical evidence exists that is at least consistent with this distraction
theory. For example, finance scholars at NYU’s Stern School of Business found that on average the profitability of a company, as measured by operating return on assets, fell by roughly 2.4 percentage
points in the two years after the death of a CEO’s child than in the
two previous years.24 There was also a drop in the company’s return
on assets after the death of a CEO’s parent25 (although no statistically significant change after the death of a mother-in-law).26
The second scenario involves personal information that shareholders would consider relevant because it provides some insight regarding the executive’s ability to retain the job. A few versions of this
theory are plausible. First, shareholders may believe that a particular executive is especially good at his or her job, and there is a concern about losing that executive because the successor may not be
equally effective. Second, regardless of what shareholders believe
about a particular executive, there may be a belief that transitions
are necessarily hard on a company, so the very fact of an upcoming
transition is relevant to the shareholder. This theory is consistent
with the prominence of developing corporate succession plans within
the corporate governance literature.27 Finally, shareholders may believe that a particular executive is subpar, but due to various capture
and other issues, that the board is unlikely to remove that executive.
In that final scenario, shareholders would look at the personal information that suggests that the executive is likely to leave his or her
position as a positive input.
This theory does not rely on an assumption that a publicly traded
company is “likely to become extinguished or suffer irreparable longterm harm if its corporate figurehead dies or falls in infamy.”28 In actuality, very little of what a corporation does single-handedly affects
corporate performance, or causes the company to become extinguished or suffer irreparable harm. Instead, corporate performance is
a complex result of numerous relevant factors, and the ability of the
executive to stay on the job constitutes one such relevant factor.

24. Morten Bennedsenol, Francisco Pérez-González & Daniel Wolfenzon, Do CEOs
Matter? 15 (Dec. 2010) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Business
School), available at http://www1.gsb.columbia.edu/mygsb/faculty/research/pubfiles/3177/
valueceos.pdf (using data from Denmark).
25. Id. at 19.
26. Id. at 4.
27. See, e.g., Tom C.W. Lin, The Corporate Governance of Iconic Executives, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 351, 379-80 (2011) (pointing out the importance of succession plans to a company’s stability and success); Stokes, supra note 5, at 323 (arguing that good corporate governance principles would require every public company to develop a clear succession plan).
28. Abril & Olazábal, supra note 11, at 1604 (suggesting that this is a second fallacy
of the belief that executive information can impact company performance).
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A number of personal facts could impact the executive’s ability to
stay on the job, and therefore be relevant under this theory. The most
obvious example is a serious or even terminal illness as was the case
with Steve Jobs. Other examples include criminal legal problems
(putting aside those directly related to the corporation), especially
those that can result in jail time and the resulting loss of the services
of the executive. Some empirical evidence supports this theory that
the company’s performance can be impacted by the loss of an executive as well.29
In addition to personal information revealing something about the
ability of the executive to do or stay in his or her job, shareholders
might also care about executive personal facts based on a belief that
the facts reveal information about the executive’s integrity or values.
Just as others have argued that information about a corporation’s
social impact contains value given the existence of social investors
who are concerned with the social and environmental effects of corporate conduct,30 similarly, investors might rationally be concerned
with personal information revealing something about an executive’s
integrity or values that is of concern to some shareholders. The information that falls within this category bears close resemblance to
the sort of information the public has found relevant with regard to
politicians and includes things like extramarital affairs.
Some scholars criticize this theory of disclosure by pointing out
that this information is at best anecdotal evidence of the executive’s
integrity and “may have no bearing at all.”31 Certainly any information that has “no bearing at all” on either ability or integrity/value
of the executive has no disclosure interest. The remaining personal
information, however, even if merely anecdotal, remains relevant,
and the only question is a matter of degree. Although the anecdotal
nature of the evidence might suggest that “formal disclosure of such
information might on balance be more harmful than beneficial to
investors,”32 that conclusion skips ahead to the next step of the analysis where costs and benefits are balanced. Again, at this point the
question is not whether all such information ought to be disclosed,
but rather whether there is a theory under which investors benefit
from such disclosure.
Some personal facts may fall into more than one theory of disclosure. For example, whereas information about an executive’s unlawful activities may be relevant because the executive may go to jail, or
29. Jesus M. Salas, Entrenchment, Governance, and the Stock Price Reaction to Sudden Executive Deaths, 34 J. BANKING & FIN. 656, 657 (2010) (reviewing the executive
deaths literature that has found negative reactions to sudden executive deaths).
30. See Williams, supra note 9, at 1273-88, 1293-96.
31. Abril & Olazábal, supra note 11, at 1600.
32. Id.
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be distracted from his or her duties, the same information might also
be relevant because it tells shareholders something about that executive’s values or integrity. Other personal facts may not fall into any
theory of beneficial disclosure. For those facts, the privacy-disclosure
problem set out by this Article does not apply, as there is no legitimate
disclosure interest in conflict with the executive’s privacy interest.
Although most of the media publicity has involved executives who
have achieved a certain level of personal fame, the same theories
identified for why shareholders would care about executives’ personal
information apply to senior level executives who are less notorious.
Although certainly not every corporate executive is as vital to a company as Steve Jobs or Warren Buffett, the difference is one of degree
rather than of kind. The salaries commanded by senior level executives33 suggest that corporations and shareholders believe that they
are valuable to the company and accordingly that their performances
matter. Hence it is logical that distractions from that performance
would also matter. In fact, it may be the case that executives at publically traded companies that are smaller may matter even more, because in the smaller companies the executive holds more specific
knowledge about all aspects of the company’s performance.
B. The Privacy Interest
In addition to the typical costs recognized in the corporate literature as inherent whenever there is disclosure, the question of whether to disclose the personal information of executives requires consideration of an additional cost—namely interference with the executives’ privacy interests. This section addresses privacy interests as a
potential cost of a disclosure policy, or something to be considered as
a competing consideration against the disclosure interest discussed
above. This section does not have in mind a legal privacy right, which
would inherently prevent disclosure.34 The normative and policy
problem considered in this Article is triggered not only when disclosure impinges upon legal privacy rights, but also whenever disclosure
requires impinging upon a privacy interest, regardless of whether

33. See Daniel J. Morrissey, Executive Compensation and Income Inequality, 4 WM. &
MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 13-16 (2013) (describing and lamenting the rise of executive compensation); David I. Walker, Who Bears the Cost of Excessive Executive Compensation (And
Other Corporate Agency Costs), 57 VILL. L. REV. 653, 658-61 (2012) (providing various statistics for the high levels of executive pay).
34. See Ferdinand Schoeman, Privacy: Philosophical Dimensions of the Literature, in
PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY 1, 3-4 (Ferdinand David Schoeman ed., 1984) (recognizing that the issue of loss of privacy should be disentangled from
the question of infringement upon a right to privacy).
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that interest has already been legally recognized as a constitutional,
statutory, or common law privacy right.35
1. Accounts of the Value of Privacy
Just as scholars have not reached a consensus account of the value
of disclosure, similarly there are numerous accounts of the value of
privacy. Overall, traditional privacy scholarship across disciplines
identified two main clusters of explanations for why privacy is important and valuable to society:36 (1) “privacy is a key component in
the more general regard for human dignity,” which includes appeals
to “such conditions as moral integrity, individuality consciousness of
oneself as a being with moral character and worth, and consciousness
of oneself as a being with a point of view, searching for meaning in
life”; and (2) privacy is essential to interpersonal relationships, which
includes an “understanding of ourselves as social beings with varying
kinds of relationships, each in its way important to a meaningful
life.”37 Additionally, the developing economics of privacy literature
addresses the value of privacy with regard to economic terms.
One reason for taking into account the privacy of executives is
that there is a relationship between respect for privacy and respect
for individual dignity more generally. Warren and Brandeis’ famous
1890 article “The Right to Privacy” contains early hints of this idea.38
Warren and Brandeis defended the importance of protecting privacy
in reference to other values already deemed worth protecting, such as
the individual’s right to be left alone and the respect due an individual’s inviolate personality.39 They suggested that these values relate
to a person’s self-estimate and others’ estimates of that person’s feel-

35. By contrast, other scholars have focused on a conflict with privacy rights rather
than interests. See Heminway, supra note 5, at 771-72 (criticizing the existing disclosure
regime for creating tension with the right to privacy); Lin, Undressing the CEO, supra note
11, at 423-25 (dismissing concerns about individual privacy rights); Stokes, supra note 5, at
311-13 (examining the right to privacy rather than an interest in privacy).
36. While this discussion of privacy is necessarily rooted in American culture and
society, scholars have argued that privacy is a more universal value. For example, in “The
Origins of Modern Claims to Privacy,” Alan Westin concluded that although the specific
forms it may take may differ, privacy appears to be a cultural value across all human societies. ALAN F. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 12-13 (1967). Similarly, Robert Murphy argues in his essay “Social Distance and the Veil” that privacy is recognized and institutionalized in all societies, and is essential to the maintenance of both social relationships and
the sense of self. Robert F. Murphy, Social Distance and the Veil, in PHILOSOPHICAL DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY, supra note 34, at 34-35 (arguing that the modern
understanding of the private realm originated in classical Greek times as those aspects of
life activities that people shared with lesser beings, not as those necessary for the flourishing of uniquely human activities).
37. Schoeman, supra note 34, at 8 (classifying the various value of privacy literature
as fundamentally falling into these two categories).
38. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 6, at 196.
39. Id. at 205-07.
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ings. By their account, society and the law ought to recognize the
moral and spiritual integrity of individuals.40
Subsequently, Edward Bloustein expanded upon the idea of inviolate personality introduced by Warren and Brandeis as central to the
role of privacy.41 Bloustein included other values such as individual
dignity and integrity, personal uniqueness, and personal autonomy,42
and argued that it is respect for these values, which underlies giving
individuals the right to determine to whom their thoughts, emotions,
sentiments, and tangible products are communicated. Bloustein argued that privacy is essential to an individual’s uniqueness, autonomy, and sense of moral personality.43 Similarly, Stanley Benn argued
that something basic to the notion of respect for persons underlies
society’s desire to respect a person’s choice to act in private.44 Benn
suggested that society’s privacy ideals are tightly linked to ideals
about life and character.45 Finally, Jeffrey Reiman defended privacy
in terms of individualistic moral considerations, as “a social ritual by
means of which an individual’s moral title to his own existence is conferred.”46 In this view, privacy is an essential part of a social practice
by which a society communicates to the individual that this existence
is rightfully his or her own.47 Without such a practice, Reiman theorized that a person’s very sense of self as something morally distinctive could not develop.48 Included in Reiman’s vision of moral autonomy and personhood is the ability to determine what about our
thoughts and body is experienced by others.49
A second reason to take into account the privacy preferences of
executives is that privacy plays a role in assisting individuals to
maintain interpersonal relationships that are the key to a functioning society. Charles Fried explained that the fundamental capacity to
form important, intimate relationships of love, friendship, and trust
requires the ability to choose when to relinquish aspects of one’s inner
self to another.50
40. Other scholars disagreed and contended that the interest in privacy can be reduced to reputation, emotional tranquility, and proprietary gain, rather than something
unique to privacy. See Frederick Davis, What Do We Mean by “Right to Privacy”?, 4 S.D. L.
REV. 1, 7-12 (1959); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 406-07 (1960).
41. Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964).
42. Id. at 1002-03.
43. Id.
44. Stanley I. Benn, Privacy, Freedom, and Respect for Persons, in PHILOSOPHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF PRIVACY: AN ANTHOLOGY, supra note 34, at 223, 231-32.
45. Id. at 235-43.
46. Jeffrey H. Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy, and Personhood, 6 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 26,
39 (1975).
47. Id. at 39, 43.
48. Id. at 39.
49. Id. at 42.
50. Charles Fried, Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 480 (1968).
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Fried’s theory of privacy formed the foundation for other interpersonal relationship-based views of privacy.51 James Rachels generalized Fried’s position, noting that not only can privacy be the way to
privilege intimate relationships, but privacy is also central to a person’s ability to maintain varying kinds of relationships regardless of
intimacy.52 Similarly, Robert Gerstein argued that intimacy could not
occur without privacy.53 Gerstein explained that intimate relationships
require parties to behave as what he called “participants,” which requires a sense of abandon that is not possible absent privacy.54 Privacy
is also essential to provide individuals with the ability to form independent judgments about social norms.55 As part of an otherwise diverse account of privacy, Ruth Gavison noted that privacy allows for
important interactions among people with different points of view
without the need to address areas of disagreement.56 Privacy allows
individuals the emotional and intellectual space to thoughtfully consider troubling ideas without social pressure.57
As a multi-disciplinary issue, until this point the discussion of privacy has been in the language of values and philosophical, sociological, and psychological interests. While these interests are conceptually legitimate, when the opposing interest is economic, such as the
shareholder interest in the disclosure of information, it can be difficult to know how to compare these far more amorphous discussions of
privacy interests. For this reason, the economics of privacy literature
can add a useful addition to consider the tradeoffs required in policies
addressing privacy.58
Led by Richard Posner, early economic treatments of privacy in
the late 1970s to early 1980s questioned the value of privacy and contended that markets for personal information would work adequately
without any regulation.59 Concerned with overregulation in attempting to protect privacy, this early literature attacked privacy as not
social wealth maximizing. For example, Posner argued that privacy
51. See Schoeman, supra note 34, at 22.
52. Id. at 24.
53. Id. at 23.
54. Robert S. Gerstein, Intimacy and Privacy, 89 ETHICS 76, 77 (1978).
55. Robert S. Gerstein, California’s Constitutional Right to Privacy: The Development
of the Protection of Private Life, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 385, 422 (1982).
56. Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 455-56 (1980).
57. Id. at 443.
58. See generally Kai-Lung Hui & I.P.L. Png, The Economics of Privacy, in ECONOMICS AND INFORMATION SYSTEMS 471 (Terrence Hendershott ed., 2006) (providing a useful
review of the economics of privacy literature).
59. Id. at 473; Jack Hirshleifer, Privacy: Its Origin, Function, and Future, 9 J. LEGAL
STUD. 649, 658, 663-64 (1980); Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of Privacy, REGULATION, May-June 1978, at 19, 26; Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy, and Reputation, 28
BUFF. L. REV. 1, 1-7 (1979); Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Privacy, 71 AM. ECON.
REV. 405, 408 (1981); George J. Stigler, An Introduction to Privacy in Economics and Politics, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 640 (1980).
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is best understood not as a legitimate interest in its own right, but
rather as an “intermediate good.”60 Posner viewed the interest in
privacy as motivated by a socially suboptimal desire to hide either
“information concerning past or present criminal activity, or moral
conduct at variance with the individual’s professed moral standards,”
or information that would “correct misapprehensions that the individual is trying to exploit.”61 Under this conception of privacy, any government regulation supporting privacy would be inherently inefficient.
After a long silence, scholars returned to consider this vision of
privacy in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s. Much of this
scholarship came to the defense of privacy, both rejecting Posner’s
narrow understanding of the benefits of privacy as well as pointing
out that “there are dynamic benefits to privacy beyond the ‘taste’ for
privacy that an individual may have.”62 For example, Richard Murphy noted that “manipulating reputation is not the only reason people desire privacy,” and that other “psychic values count” in the “utility calculus” in determining when limiting disclosure of information
is appropriate.63 Similarly, Paul Schwartz argued that a strong economic argument can be made in favor of privacy, and that the narrow
view of social utility “ignores the positive economic role that data privacy plays in many circumstances.”64 Writing from a consumer law
perspective, Jeff Sovern noted that consumers seem to reject the
Posner vision of privacy as a means to an end rather than an end in
itself.65 Rosen argued that Posner’s vision of privacy fails to recognize
that a “central value of privacy” is to prevent individuals “from being
misidentified and judged out of context in a world of short attention
spans, a world in which information can easily be confused with
knowledge.”66 Certain categories of information about executives
might be subject to Rosen’s argument. For example, executives might
want to keep the specific details of health information private because of a belief that shareholders—the vast majority of whom are
not trained in medicine—will not understand the actual implications
of the health issue for the executive’s performance.
60. Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 394 (1978).
61. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 233-34 (1983) (arguing that the
individual want for privacy stems from people’s desire “to manipulate the world around
them by selective disclosure of facts about themselves”).
62. Richard S. Murphy, Property Rights in Personal Information: An Economic Defense of Privacy, 84 GEO. L.J. 2381, 2383 (1996).
63. Id. at 2386.
64. Paul M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1, 22 (1997).
65. Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of
Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1052 (1999).
66. JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN AMERICA
8 (2000); see also Lawrence Lessig, Privacy and Attention Span, 89 GEO. L.J. 2063 (2001)
(expanding Rosen’s argument beyond the privacy context).
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Finally, the economics of privacy literature recognized the secondary harms that can occur when privacy is not adequately protected.
For example, disclosure, or interference with privacy, can diminish
the extent to which people engage in the underlying activity. This
constitutes a social harm unless society wants to discourage the underlying activity.67 In the context of personal health care information,
this sort of distortion can lead to negative consequences including
declines in preventive care.68
With privacy largely rehabilitated as a legitimate interest, a new
economics of privacy emerged, which not only sought to reconsider
privacy questions in light of technological developments,69 but also for
the first time applied formal microeconomic modeling to various aspects of the privacy debate. Significantly, the new literature recognized privacy as a legitimate interest worthy of economic protection,
although not at all costs.70 This literature also explored the role of
contracts and the market in addressing various privacy-based problems.71 Similarly, this Article recognizes the executive’s privacy as an
interest worthy of society’s consideration, but grapples with how to
measure the value of that interest in light of competing disclosure
costs to protection.
2. Heterogeneous Privacy Preferences
Evidence suggests that individual privacy preferences are heterogeneous. While numerous studies and surveys demonstrate that individuals value privacy, no conclusive work has established a measurement or distribution of that value.72 Most of the work that has
been done within the consumer context, however, is consistent with a
view that privacy preferences are heterogeneous.73 For example, several polls suggest that some consumers have more of a taste for privacy than others. A 1990 Equifax survey showed that 39% of respondents viewed the sharing of information by companies in the
67. Murphy, supra note 62, at 2387.
68. Schwartz, supra note 64, at 31-33.
69. See A. Michael Froomkin, The Death of Privacy?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1461 (2000)
(applying aspects of a law and economics approach in concluding that privacy is not dead
despite the various technological advancements encroaching upon it).
70. See id. at 1467.
71. Patricia Sánchez Abril, Private Ordering: A Contractual Approach to Online Interpersonal Privacy, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 689 (2010) (proposing a standardized system of
online user-to-user confidentiality agreements as a way to address privacy in social media);
Karl T. Muth, Googlestroika: Privatizing Privacy, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 337 (2009) (describing
from a law-and-economics perspective why Google is ideally positioned to price privacy);
Joseph Siprut, Privacy Through Anonymity: An Economic Argument for Expanding the
Right of Privacy in Public Places, 33 PEPP. L. REV. 311 (2006) (arguing for expanding the
right of privacy by extending the reach of related tort law for economic reasons).
72. Hui & Png, supra note 58, at 489.
73. Further empirical work demonstrating the heterogeneity of privacy preferences for
both individuals and specifically executives would helpfully contribute to this scholarship.
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same industry as a major problem, 43% called it a minor problem,
and 16% said it was not a problem at all.74 Similarly, 57% of consumers
responded that providing excessively personal information is a major
problem, 33% identified it as a minor problem, and 10% identified no
problem at all.75 This complicates the already challenging question of
how to account for competing privacy and disclosure interests.
Extrapolating from similar privacy opinion surveys, privacy scholar Alan Westin concluded that the American public can be divided
into three basic clusters of privacy preferences.76 At one extreme are
the privacy fundamentalists, which Westin estimated to be approximately 25% of the population.77 Privacy fundamentalists view privacy
as “especially high value,” and believe that more individuals should
refuse to give out information they are asked for.78 The largest group,
which Westin called privacy pragmatists and estimated at 55% of the
population, takes a more nuanced approach to privacy.79 This group
balances the value of requests for personal information both to them
and society and “decides whether they will agree or disagree with
specific information activities.”80 Finally, the privacy unconcerned
group, estimated at 20%, fails to recognize “what the ‘privacy fuss’ is
all about.”81 This group has no objection to supplying personal information to the government or businesses.82
Similarly, business scholar Il-Horn Hann, and information systems scholars Kai-Lung Hui, Tom S. Lee, and I.P.L. Png identified
three distinct segments in the consumer population based on privacy
preferences.83 Rather than using opinion surveys, these scholars employed the technique of conjoint analysis84 across focus groups in both
the United States and Singapore to assess trade-offs among five dimensions—two benefits and three privacy concerns.85 Employing cluster analysis,86 Hann, Hui, Lee, and Png found that 72% of the Ameri-

74. Sovern, supra note 65, at 1059.
75. Id.
76. Westin, supra note 10.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Hann et al., supra note 10, at 3.
84. Conjoint analysis is a technique that presents test subjects with a set of alternatives consisting of particular levels of various dimensions. The subject is then asked to
rank the alternatives based on individual preferences. Conjoint analysis then assumes that
the ranking “can be decomposed into the sum of contributions from the multiple dimensions.” Then each part-worth is equivalent to the marginal utility of the dimension in the
individual’s ranking of the conjoint stimuli. Id. at 8.
85. Id. at 9.
86. Cluster analysis “groups subjects into distinct segments according to the similarity
of their estimated part-worths for the various dimensions.” Id. at 14.
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can subjects can be characterized as “privacy guardians”—those who
attach a relatively high value to information privacy.87 Approximately 20% of the American subjects can be characterized as “information
sellers”—those who attach a relatively high value to monetary reward without much regard for privacy.88
Although the conjoint analysis study broke down the groups differently than Westin, both observe very different attitudes towards
privacy across individuals.89 Despite possible methodological problems with both public opinion surveys90 and the conjoint analysis
study,91 this scholarship is at least consistent with the idea that some
individuals “have more of a taste for privacy than others.”92 Behavioral economic theories may also support the idea that privacy preferences are heterogeneous. Economists hypothesize that “[p]ersonal
information is such a sensitive thing that individual behavior is relatively more likely to depart from the rational model with respect to
personal information than other things.”93
Despite the fact that this scholarship has taken place in the context of consumer preferences, there is no particular reason to believe
that the pool of potential corporate executives would be different
from the general population in having heterogeneity of preferences.
Therefore, although further work is necessary to be able to say with
any certainty that (absent sorting resulting from existing disclosure
policies) executive privacy preferences would be heterogeneous, the
existing evidence is certainly consistent with that hypothesis.
If in fact privacy preferences are heterogeneous, and it is both difficult to measure those preferences, as well as to fully understand
how those preferences are distributed, then creating a singular uniform policy that adequately accounts for both disclosure and privacy
interests would be challenging. Instead, these broad differences in
privacy preferences suggest that for any rule to adequately accommodate the preferences of different individuals, that rule will need to

87. Id. at 15.
88. Id. Finally, the smallest cluster of subjects focused exclusively on convenience
with little regard for money or website privacy policies. This final group, however, is less
relevant outside the context of consumer studies, as convenience plays less of a role in the
executive disclosure context. Id.
89. See id. at 16.
90. Although surveys may be affected by the manner in which the questions are
posed, even taking this into account, Sovern concludes that the surveys seem to indicate
that consumers are divided. Sovern, supra note 65, at 1061.
91. For example, the authors point that the subjects were all undergraduate students
and therefore would want to verify the findings with a more representative sample of subjects. Hann et al., supra note 10, at 19.
92. Sovern, supra note 65, at 1058.
93. Hui & Png, supra note 58, at 492.
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be flexible by design.94 Heterogeneous privacy preferences may also
suggest additional reasons that reinforce why the executive’s interest
in privacy should not be easily dismissed. Absent an ability to protect
privacy in some way, a private candidate for a corporate executive
position may forgo the opportunity for fear that it will require unacceptable intrusions of privacy. Since there is no reason to believe that
society inherently prefers corporate executives who do not care about
privacy, the sorting that would result harms society by unnecessarily
limiting the pool of individuals who can then be corporate executives
in public companies. Furthermore, to the extent that corporations are
increasingly in a position of imposing upon the privacy of individuals,95 there may be a problem with allowing decisionmaking about the
privacy of society to be concentrated largely in the hands of those
with lower valuations of privacy.96
C. Status Quo Failures
The privacy-disclosure problem explained thus far requires a solution that appropriately considers both the disclosure and privacy interests, and takes into account the fact that privacy preferences may
be heterogeneous.97 The status quo fails to satisfy these requirements. Although it is unclear what exactly is required with regard to
disclosure of personal information about executives under the current
corporate disclosure regime, it is clear that the regime offers no explicit method for taking into account privacy interests, much less
heterogeneity in those interests.98 At the same time, the various statutory, constitutional, and tortious privacy laws were not designed to
target the corporate disclosure context, and thus fail to adequately
94. See id. at 1059 (making a similar point in the consumer context). See also Cass R.
Sunstein, Impersonal Default Rules vs. Active Choices vs. Personalized Default Rules: A Triptych 25 (Mossavar-Rahmani Ctr. for Bus. & Gov’t, Working Paper RPP-2012-17, 2012) (pointing out the implications of heterogeneity on personalized default rules).
95. See Marcy E. Peek, Information Privacy and Corporate Power: Towards a
Re-Imagination of Information Privacy Law, 37 SETON HALL L. REV. 127, 137-60 (2006)
(arguing that information privacy is governed not just by governmental law but also by
corporations via private governance).
96. This concern will be explored further in future scholarship.
97. See supra Part II.
98. The scholars and practitioners considering the privacy-disclosure problem and
attempting solutions to that problem have also not accounted for the additional wrinkle of
possible heterogeneity in privacy preferences. See Heminway, supra note 5, at 790-96 (describing a proposal for a new way of dealing with disclosure of executives’ personal facts);
Horwich, supra note 11, at 862-70 (proposing an addition to form 8-K addressing specifically disclosure of serious illness of executives); Lin, Undressing the CEO, supra note 11, at
409-16 (describing a two-step, principle-based model for disclosure); Andrew K. Glenn,
Note, Disclosure of Executive Illnesses Under Federal Securities Law and the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990: Hobson’s Choice or Business Necessity?, 16 CARDOZO L. REV.
537, 588-89 (1994) (proposing a safe harbor for corporations for nondisclosure of executive
health information). But see Abril & Olazábal, supra note 11, at 1549-50 (defending the
status quo).
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address the problem. With neither corporate law nor privacy law
providing any clarity, corporations, executives, and shareholders lack
guidance and certainty with regard to the disclosure of the executives’ personal information.
1. Corporate Disclosure Rules Ignore Privacy
No consensus exists regarding when and under what circumstances the disclosure of private facts about executives is required under
the existing legal corporate disclosure regulatory and statutory
framework.99 Other than specific rules requiring the disclosure of the
CEO’s age,100 the CEO’s involvement in certain legal proceedings,101
and the compensation of five highly paid executives,102 the existing
securities rules and regulations governing corporate disclosure contain no specific itemized guidance for disclosure of personal information about executives. Instead, private facts about executives seem
to be subject to disclosure under the same general disclosure regime
created by the Exchange Act and the SEC rules as other types of corporate information.103 Scholars and practitioners disagree, however,
as to whether there is anything in the securities laws that creates a
duty to disclose personal information about executives.104
99. See, e.g., Nocera, supra note 1 (“There are no hard and fast rules about how
and when companies need to disclose information about the health of their chief executives.”); Benjamin Pimentel, Public Disclosure: Health of CEOs Brings Up Issues of
Personal Privacy, S.F. CHRON. (Aug. 3, 2004), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/
Public-disclosure-Health-of-CEOs-brings-up-2736558.php (“There are no rules on what
CEOs are supposed to disclose about their health. . . . ‘The question is what and when and
how much, and that’s always been a matter of some dispute.’ ” (citation omitted)); Brad
Stone, Apple Chief Goes Public on Health, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 2009, at B1 (reporting that a
former SEC commissioner stated that there was little agreement among legal scholars
about what needs to be disclosed when a CEO becomes ill).
100. Item 401 of Regulation S-K requires disclosure of general biographical detail including the CEO’s age. 17 C.F.R. § 229.401(b) (2012).
101. Item 401(f) of Regulation S-K requires the company to disclose the CEO’s personal
bankruptcy filings, any adjudicated violations of the securities or commodities laws, and
the fact that the CEO “was convicted in a criminal proceeding or is a named subject of a
pending criminal proceeding (excluding traffic violations and other minor offenses).” This
rule does not on its face apply to most types of civil litigation, such as divorce or a criminal
investigation. Id. § 229.401(f)(1), (2).
102. Regulation S-K, Item 402, requires disclosure of the salary, bonus, stock awards,
stock option awards, and other components of compensation for the principal executive
officer, principal financial officer, and the three most highly compensated executive officers
other than the former. Id. § 229.402.
103. See Stone, supra note 99 (noting a statement by a former member of the SEC that
while there are no specific disclosure requirements for the health of corporate officers,
there is also nothing in the federal securities laws about privacy rights).
104. Compare Abril & Olazábal, supra note 11, at 1591 (finding no basis for an affirmative duty to disclose private CEO facts), with Horwich, supra note 11, at 838 (expressing
that there is “little doubt that [the requirement to disclose ‘known . . . uncertainties . . .
that the registrant reasonably expects will have a material . . . unfavorable impact on net
sales or revenues or incomes from continuing operations’] would encompass material uncertainties arising out of a known health problem suffered by a luminary” (footnote and
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Where a duty to disclose arises, disclosure issues primarily depend
on whether a given fact is material.105 Under existing Supreme Court
precedent information is material if there is a substantial likelihood
that a reasonable shareholder would consider the information important in making an investment decision, or if disclosure of the
fact would be viewed by a reasonable investor as significantly altering the “total mix” of information.106 For so-called soft information
regarding predictions and other forward-looking information, a
somewhat different test applies, in which materiality depends on “a
balancing of both the indicated probability that the event will occur
and the anticipated magnitude of the event in light of the totality of
the company activity.”107
Neither of these tests contains any explicit consideration of privacy as a countervailing interest, yet some commentators seem to sense
that privacy does, or at least ought to, play a role in the analysis.108
Even in the absence of an explicit privacy consideration, scholars
and commentators have noted the difficulty in applying these materiality standards to the personal information of executives.109 No
court decision has weighed in on the question, nor has the SEC offered any guidelines.110
2. Privacy Law Lacks Clarity
The various privacy laws fail to add clarity to the corporate disclosure framework. A clearly defined constitutional informational privacy right would eliminate or at least narrow the normative policy
question because it would be unconstitutional for the government
to mandate disclosure of at least some categories of executive
information. No such clearly established informational privacy right

citation omitted)), and id. at 841 (finding a possible duty to disclose from the Rule 12b-20
requirement for disclosing material omissions). Accord Heminway, supra note 5, at 757
(noting that “the gap-filling rules may require public disclosure of executives’ personal
facts”).
105. See Abril & Olazábal, supra note 11, at 1596-1600 (distinguishing the duty to
disclose from the concept of materiality and explaining that materiality only comes into
play once a duty to disclose has been triggered).
106. Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231-32 (1988) (quoting TSC Indus., Inc. v.
Northway, Inc., 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976)).
107. Basic, 485 U.S. at 238.
108. Patrick McGurn, senior vice president of Institutional Shareholder Services, explained that while there is no clear rule for when corporations must disclose personal information, part of that analysis involves weighing an individual’s privacy rights against
the value of that information to the marketplace. See Pimentel, supra note 99.
109. Horwich, supra note 11, at 864 (arguing that “determining whether an ailment is
material is often difficult” and “presents difficult questions of judgment”); Lin, Undressing
the CEO, supra note 11, at 408 (explaining that the “federal securities laws along with
historic and widely-accepted practices . . . offer little clear guidance as to what a company
should do” when it comes to disclosing personal facts about executives).
110. Lin, Undressing the CEO, supra note 11, at 386.

508

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:487

exists under the current state of constitutional law.111 Although two
1977 Supreme Court cases, Whalen and Nixon, referred broadly to a
constitutional privacy “interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters,”112 neither case made clear that such an interest actually
existed, or what test applied to determine whether any such constitutional privacy interest had been triggered. Subsequently, circuit
courts offered varying interpretations of the two decisions, ranging
from a requirement that disclosure of some types of personal information should be subject to a balancing test between the government’s interest and the individual’s interest in avoiding disclosure,113
to a belief that any constitutional informational privacy right only
extends to interests “that can be deemed ‘fundamental’ or ‘implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty.’ ”114 The D.C. Circuit went so far as
to express “grave doubts as to the existence of a constitutional right
[to informational] privacy.”115
More recently, the Supreme Court again weighed in on the question of an informational right to privacy in NASA v. Nelson,116 but did
not provide much further clarity. The majority opinion chose to “assume, without deciding, that the Constitution protects” a constitutional privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters.117
In applying this hypothetical constitutional right, the Court appears
to have balanced the governmental interest with the privacy interest,
but did so without any clear articulation of the governing rules. The
Court does not appear to have applied the “fundamental rights” strict
scrutiny analysis of Roe v. Wade,118 but instead described the government’s actions as “reasonable and further[ing] its interests.”119 In fact,
the Court seemed to reject a strict scrutiny inquiry, at least in the particular context at issue in that decision, when it rejected the argument
that the government “has a constitutional burden to demonstrate that

111. But see Stokes, supra note 5, at 313-22 (concluding that a regulation requiring
corporate executives to disclose health issues to shareholders would not be constitutional).
112. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S.
425, 457 (1977) (citing Whalen).
113. See In re Crawford, 194 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1999); Woodland v. City of
Houston, 940 F.2d 134, 138 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Fraternal Order of Police v. City
of Phila., 812 F.2d 105, 110 (3d Cir. 1987); Barry v. City of New York, 712 F.2d 1554, 1559
(2d Cir. 1983).
114. J.P. v. DeSanti, 653 F.2d 1080, 1090 (1981).
115. Am. Fed’n of Gov’t Emps. v. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 118 F.3d 786, 791 (D.C.
Cir. 1997).
116. 131 S. Ct. 746 (2011).
117. Id. at 751.
118. 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). Others had suggested that such a strict scrutiny test
would apply to informational privacy. See Stokes, supra note 5, at 314 (“[C]ourts would
next likely apply the strict scrutiny test to determine whether the regulation is narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling state interest, and goes no further than necessary to accomplish this objective.”).
119. NASA, 131 S. Ct. at 761.
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its questions are ‘necessary’ or the least restrictive means of furthering its interests.”120 In a pair of concurrences, both Justice Scalia and
Justice Thomas stated that they would have held that a “federal constitutional right to ‘informational privacy’ does not exist.”121
In short, even after NASA it is not clear that a constitutional right
to informational privacy exists. Furthermore, even if such a right
does exist, it seems likely that a government regulation requiring
corporate executives to disclose some personal information would still
pass constitutional muster, as long as the regulation sought to reach
some sort of balance between the government’s interest in requiring
disclosure in order to keep the markets functioning properly on behalf of shareholders, and the privacy interest of the executive.
Similarly, the various federal and state statutory privacy protections do not resolve the disclosure-privacy issue in part because they
were not designed with this particular problem in mind. Many privacy statutes in the United States are specifically tailored to a particular problem, and none seem to anticipate this particular situation.122
Many federal privacy statutes only apply to certain statutorily defined entities. For example, in the context of health information, the
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), enacted by Congress in 1996, seeks to protect the security and privacy of
health information.123 The “Privacy Rule” regulations implementing
HIPAA protect the privacy of health information, in part by prohibiting its disclosure without the consent of the individual, unless the
disclosure is pursuant to one of the enumerated exceptions.124 HIPAA
only applies, however, to “covered entities,” which include (1) health
plans, (2) health care clearinghouses, (3) health care providers, as
well as business associates to those covered entities.125 Although the
regulations did recognize the need to strike a balance between privacy concerns and the need to use certain health care information,
the primary focus was on improving the efficiency of the health care

120. Id. at 760.
121. Id. at 764 (Scalia, J., concurring); see also id. at 769 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(“[T]he Constitution does not protect a right to informational privacy.”).
122. See Abril & Olazábal, supra note 11, at 1567-75 (examining the implications of
various privacy-related federal statutes on corporate disclosure obligations and concluding
that many employment-related privacy statutes apply in very limited situations and have
“idiosyncratic application”). But see Glenn, supra note 98, at 588 (treating the problem as a
conflict between the requirements imposed by the corporate disclosure obligations of the
federal securities laws and the ADA’s confidentiality provisions, in which corporations are
faced with a “Hobson’s choice of liability under the ADA or liability under the Securities
and Exchange Acts”).
123. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110
Stat. 1936 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18, 26, 29 and 42 U.S.C.).
124. 45 C.F.R. §§ 160, 164 (2012).
125. Id. § 160.103.

510

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:487

system.126 Therefore, unrelated (albeit similar) concerns regarding
the disclosure of executive information were not really on the radar,
and corporate employers would not fall within HIPAA’s definition of
covered entities. Similarly, the Right to Financial Privacy Act of
1978127 only prevents banks or other financial institutions from disclosing an individual’s financial information to the government. It
would not prevent most corporate employers from disclosing financial
or other personal information about executives to its shareholders.
Other privacy statutes would apply to the corporation as an employer, but only limit use of information obtained in very specific
ways. Most significantly, the Americans with Disabilities Act,128 the
Rehabilitation Act,129 and the Family and Medical Leave Act130 all
contain nondisclosure provisions with regard to the disclosure of certain types of health and disability-related information. On their face,
these statutes do not contain any explicit provisions under which an
employee can waive rights of confidentiality for medical information.
As a result, some have argued that the ADA may prevent any mandatory shareholder disclosure requirement of executive illnesses.131
The case law interpreting the ADA and the other related statutes,
however, has interpreted the nondisclosure provisions to be limited to
information obtained as the result of an authorized medical examination or inquiry. Information obtained by the employer as the result of
a voluntary disclosure on the part of the employee may be disclosed
without consequence under these statutes. In Cash v. Smith, for example, the Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff could not recover
under the nondisclosure provisions of the ADA, Rehabilitation Act,
and FMLA when she had told a manager of her diabetes diagnosis “in
confidence.”132 The court found that the disclosure to the employer
was voluntary, and therefore the statutory provisions did not apply.133 Similarly, in EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., the Tenth Circuit
held that when an employee voluntarily informed his human
resources manager that he was HIV positive, there was no violation
of the ADA nondisclosure provisions when the company created
an acknowledgement form to inform his driver trainees of his HIV

126. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed.
Reg. 82,426, 82,464 (Dec. 28, 2000); 67 Fed. Reg. 14,776, 14,778-83 (proposed Mar. 27,
2002); 67 Fed. Reg. 53,182, 53,208 (Aug. 14, 2002).
127. 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401-3421 (2012).
128. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012).
129. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012).
130. Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6
(codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2012)).
131. Glenn, supra note 98, at 588.
132. Cash v. Smith, 231 F.3d 1301, 1303 (11th Cir. 2000).
133. Id. at 1307.
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status.134 This means that a corporation could disclose the healthrelated information of an executive if the executive voluntarily revealed the information to the corporation.
Furthermore, district courts following the Cash and C.R. England
precedents have taken a broad understanding of what constitutes a
voluntary disclosure. For example, courts have found that a disclosure was voluntary when an employer e-mailed an employee stating,
“We need to know what’s going on,” when the employee had missed
work without any explanation.135 The court held that even though the
employer initiated the interaction, because the employer did not ask
specifically about a medical condition, this did not constitute a request or demand for medical information by the employer that would
trigger the nondisclosure provisions of the ADA.136 Similarly, courts
have found that when an employer asks, “Is everything okay?” after
an employee returns from a medical appointment, if the employee
then proceeds to disclose the diagnosis and related disability, this
constitutes a voluntary disclosure that does not trigger the nondisclosure protections of the ADA.137 Consequently, if a corporation notices
a change in an executive’s physical appearance and just asks the executive, “Is everything okay?” the corporation would have no nondisclosure obligation under the ADA and the related statutes with respect to any information provided pursuant to that inquiry.
Other privacy statutes also limit protections to information obtained in particular ways. For example, the Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988 (EPPA) prohibits private employers from requiring employees or prospective employees from taking a lie detector
test, or to use the results of such a test.138 Similarly, the Fair Credit
Reporting Act covers an employer’s use of information collected as
part of a “consumer report” on an employment application.139 Neither
statute governs the disclosure of employee information more generally, much less considers the particular circumstances of an executivelevel employee in a publically traded corporation.
By contrast, genetic information may constitute the one category
of information where privacy laws may limit corporate disclosure
of personal information about executives. In addition to its various
provisions prohibiting discrimination against employees because of
genetic information, the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act
134. EEOC v. C.R. England, Inc., 644 F.3d 1028, 1032-33, 1046-48 (10th Cir. 2011); see
also Ballard v. Healthsouth Corp., 147 F. Supp. 2d 529, 534-35 (N.D. Tex. 2001) (finding no
breach of confidentiality under the ADA when employee voluntarily disclosed the result of his
HIV test to his manager, although he asked the manager to keep the information confidential).
135. EEOC v. Thrivent Fin. for Lutherans, 795 F. Supp. 2d 840, 842 (E.D. Wis. 2011).
136. Id. at 845.
137. Sherrer v. Hamilton Cnty. Bd. of Health, 747 F. Supp. 2d 924, 931-34 (S.D. Ohio 2010).
138. 29 U.S.C. § 2002 (2012).
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1681m(a) (2012).
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of 2008 (GINA),140 contains limitations on disclosure of genetic information.141 Although there is not yet any case law interpreting these
provisions, GINA appears to limit corporations from disclosing genetic information concerning its corporate executives to its shareholders,
although it is unclear whether there would be any problem under
GINA with the executive him or herself making the disclosure.
3. Corporate Practice Reflects Uncertainty
Corporate disclosure behavior mirrors the lack of clarity in the
existing law. Corporations seeking to strike the appropriate balance
between executive privacy and shareholder disclosure obligations
have taken vastly different approaches.142 This state of confusion
leaves both executives and shareholders uncertain as to when to expect disclosure of personal information about the executives.
Apple’s widely-discussed decision to take a strong nondisclosure
position with regard to the health of CEO Steve Jobs provides an example of one possible approach. In October 2003, doctors diagnosed
Jobs with a rare treatable form of pancreatic cancer, for which the
vast majority of those who had the tumor surgically removed survived at least ten years.143 Skeptical of mainstream medicine, however, Jobs pursued alternative methods to treat his cancer rather than
undergo the operation.144 As Jobs fought his cancer without surgery,
Apple’s board of directors and executive team agonized over whether
the company needed to disclose anything about his health to shareholders.145 After seeking advice from two outside lawyers, the board
decided to say nothing.146 Ultimately, Jobs had the surgery at the end
of July 2004, and the next day in an optimistic e-mail to Apple employees, Jobs revealed that he had faced a life-threatening illness,
was now “cured,” and would return to the job in September.147 The

140. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000ff to 2000ff-11 (2012).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 2000ff-5(b) (2012).
142. See Lin, Undressing the CEO, supra note 11, at 408 (noting that “the absence of
clarity in the current regulatory model” has resulted in “disclosure practices varying from
company to company”).
143. Peter Elkind, The Trouble with Steve Jobs, FORTUNE (Mar. 5, 2008),
http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/02/news/companies/elkind_jobs.fortune/index.htm.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. Ironically, at the time some commentators praised Apple for being so forthcoming. Analyst Roger Kay of International Data Corp. speculated (wrongly) that Jobs and his
doctors suspected something was wrong, and once they confirmed it, moved quickly. Kay
praised Apple’s decision to make the news public only when it was certain of the diagnosis.
See Pimentel, supra note 99. Similarly, Patrick McGurn, senior vice president of Institutional Shareholder Services, called Apple’s disclosure “a good pre-emptive move.” Id.
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next day Apple shares fell 2.4%.148 Citing Jobs’ need for privacy, Apple would not answer further questions about his health.149
Concerns over Jobs’ health reappeared in June 2008, when his
gaunt appearance at Apple’s annual Worldwide Developers Conference triggered rumors that he was again sick.150 Investors and analysts turned to Apple for an explanation. Peter Oppenheimer, the
company’s chief financial officer replied that Jobs “serves as the
C.E.O. at the pleasure of Apple’s board and has no plans to leave Apple. Steve’s health is a private matter.”151 When Jobs announced that
he would not give his annual keynote address at the Macworld conference in January 2009, rumors escalated leading to a 2.5% drop in
Apple’s share price.152 In response, Jobs issued a letter in which he
claimed that his dramatic weight loss was due to a nutritional problem with a simple remedy and that he would continue as Apple’s
CEO.153 Only one week later, however, Jobs released another statement that his health situation was “more complex” and he would be
taking a leave from the company.154 This resulted in a 7% drop in Apple’s stock price.155 In June 2009, Apple disclosed that Jobs had received a liver transplant two months earlier, but offered no further
information.156 Finally, in January 2011, Jobs announced that he
would once again take a medical leave from Apple without sharing
any details of his condition with investors.157 In response, Apple’s
stock dropped by 2.3%, but recovered the following day in light of
news of Apple’s strong quarterly results.158 During his leave in August 2011, Jobs resigned as CEO but continued to work from home as
Chairman of the Board.159 On October 5, 2011, Jobs died from complications from his cancer at the age of 56.160
Elkind, supra note 143.
Id.
Nocera, supra note 1.
Id.
Benjamin Pimentel, Apple says 2009 Macworld Expo Will be Its Last,
MARKETWATCH (Dec. 16, 2008), http://articles.marketwatch.com/2008-12-16/news/
30741847_1_macworld-show-macworld-boston-macworld-new-york.
153. Tom Abate, Apple's Jobs Is Taking Leave, S.F. CHRONICLE, Jan. 15, 2009, at A1.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Yukari Iwatani Kane & Joann S. Lublin, Jobs Had Liver Transplant --- Apple
Chief on Track to Return to Work at End of June; No. 2 May Expand Role, WALL ST. J.
(June 20, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124546193182433491.html.
157. Yukari Iwatani Kane, Apple Soars, but Mum on Jobs, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 19,
2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703954004576090362119740134.
html.
158. Id.
159. Patricia Sullivan, Apple Visionary Steve Jobs Dies, WASH. POST (Oct. 6, 2011),
http://www.startribune.com/obituaries/131184473.html.
160. John Markoff, Redefined the Digital Age As the Visionary of Apple, N.Y. Times (Oct.
6, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/06/business/steve-jobs-of-apple-dies-at-56.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
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In contrast to Apple’s privacy-protective nondisclosure approach,
Berkshire Hathaway took a different approach with regard to the
health of its founder and chairman Warren Buffett. In 2000, Buffett
underwent colon surgery to remove benign polyps in his colon.161 As
opposed to the minimal information revealed by Apple after the fact,
Berkshire Hathaway opted to provide a detailed press release before
the surgery informing shareholders that Buffett expected to have the
surgery and the circumstances that led to the surgery.162 Then, in
2012, Berkshire Hathaway revealed that Buffett had been diagnosed
with early-stage prostate cancer and that he would undergo radiation
treatment beginning in July.163
Although undoubtedly Jobs and Buffett represent unique examples in the degree to which they were viewed as indispensable corporate
luminaries within their respective companies, the same issue of whether and to what extent personal information about executives ought to
be disclosed to shareholders arises with far less notable executives.
Some companies have chosen to disclose a good deal of information
based on an apparent belief that it is legally required for them to do
so. For example, after suffering from leukemia during his tenure as
an executive, General Motors vice-chairman Harry J. Pearce opined
that “[t]here is an absolute requirement to make full disclosure. And
by full disclosure I mean full public disclosure.”164 Consistent with
that view, GM disclosed Pearce’s illness when it was diagnosed.165
Dick Brewer, the former CEO of biotech firm Scios, took the same
position: “I don’t think you have to describe every last detail of your
illness,” he explained, “[b]ut you need to describe basically what it is,
and how it’s going to be dealt with and how you plan to manage the
company while being treated.”166 Based on that understanding,
Brewer and his company’s board immediately revealed to the shareholders when he was diagnosed with cancer.167
In 1993, Tenneco disclosed that CEO Michael Walsh had brain
cancer.168 McDonald’s also chose to disclose the news when its CEO

161. SCHROEDER, supra note 3, at 700-01.
162. Id.
163. Warren Buffett Says He Has Early Prostate Cancer, NEWSDAY (Apr. 18, 2012), http://
www.newsday.com/news/nation/warren-buffett-says-he-has-early-prostate-cancer-1.3667896.
164. Jonathan D. Glater, Five Questions for Harry J. Pearce: An Honesty Policy on
Executive Illness, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/07/08/business/
five-questions-for-harry-j-pearce-an-honesty-policy-on-executive-illness.html.
165. See George Gunset, GM Says Executive Has Leukemia, CHI. TRIB.
(June 6, 1998), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1998-06-06/business/9806060166_1_
general-motors-corp-gm-leukemia.
166. Pimentel, supra note 99.
167. Id.
168. Thomas C. Hayes, Tenneco’s Chief Has Brain Cancer, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 1993),
http://www.nytimes.com/1993/01/21/business/tenneco-s-chief-has-brain-cancer.html.
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Charles Bell was diagnosed with colon cancer.169 When Coca-Cola
Co.’s longtime chief executive and chairman, Roberto C. Goizueta,
was hospitalized for a malignant tumor in his lungs, Coca-Cola disclosed the fact of hospitalization, along with a disclosure that Goizueta had smoked cigarettes for years.170 Of course, Coca-Cola tried to
mitigate the impact of the news by also disclosing the treatment plan
and stating that the executive planned to continue working while receiving radiation treatment.171 Some outlier companies have even
gone so far as to disclose possible future health situations. For example, Google announced that one of its executives has a gene mutation
that increases his chances of having Parkinson’s disease.172
Other companies have taken Apple’s approach and disclosed far
less information about their executives. For example, Intel did not
disclose its CEO’s prostate cancer diagnosis.173 Similarly, Bear
Stearns’ CEO Jimmy Cayne opted to entirely hide his near death
from a prostate infection during the credit crisis because he feared
that disclosing the information would cause Bear Stearns’ stock to
crash. His hospitalization and life-threatening condition only came to
light once the company had been sold.174 And in contrast with
Google’s treatment of a Parkinson’s diagnoses, one chief executive
kept his Parkinson’s diagnosis secret for almost twenty years.175
Time Warner took a mixed approach with regard to the health information about CEO Steven Ross. In June 1980, Ross had a heart
attack which he kept secret on the grounds that it would be “ ‘bad for
the company’ if it became public.”176 Then in the mid-1980s, Ross was
diagnosed with prostate cancer, but the diagnosis was never publicly
disclosed despite the fact that he apparently had surgery and received radiation.177 In November 1991, however, when the cancer returned, Time Warner promptly revealed to its shareholders that Ross
169. See Nocera, supra note 1. Of course, the McDonald’s situation occurred in a particular context. The previous CEO, James R. Cantalupo, had died of a massive heart attack
at age sixty, which caused McDonald’s stock to drop 2.6%. Gibson & Steven Gray, Sudden
Loss: Death of Chief Leaves McDonald's Facing Challenges, WALL ST. J., Apr. 20, 2004, at
A1. Hours after Cantalupo’s death, Bell was appointed at the young age of forty three, but
would be diagnosed with colon cancer only two weeks later. His poor health forced Bell to
resign in November 2004, only two months before his death. Steven Gray & Jonathan Eig,
McDonald's CEO Quits to Fight Cancer, WALL ST. J., Nov. 23, 2004, at A3.
170. Brett D. Fromson, Coca-Cola’s CEO Hospitalized with Lung Cancer, WASH. POST,
Sept. 9, 1997, at C3.
171. Id.
172. See Miguel Helft, Google Co-Founder Has Genetic Code Linked to Parkinson’s,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at C2. Note that this appears to be precisely the sort of genetic
disclosure that would be prohibited by GINA, as discussed supra pp. 511-12.
173. See Nocera, supra note 1.
174. Horwich, supra note 11, at 830.
175. See David Jones, Life After Parkinson’s, 324 BRIT. MED. J. 1531 (2002).
176. CONNIE BRUCK, MASTER OF THE GAME: STEVE ROSS AND THE CREATION OF TIME
WARNER 190 (1994).
177. Id. at 226.
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had been diagnosed with cancer,178 and then subsequently disclosed
his leave of absence when he needed further treatment,179 albeit with
a positive spin. Despite Time Warner’s assurances that the “physicians are optimistic,”180 Ross never returned to his office. As with Apple and Steve Jobs, it was only in mid-June 1992 that Ross finally
publicly conceded the seriousness of his illness when he announced
that he would be taking a temporary leave of absence.181
Other companies have chosen intermediate routes, disclosing only
partial information. Kraft Foods, Inc. did not disclose the reason behind the hospitalization of its CEO, which led to a controversy.182
Most recently, Sara Lee revealed that its CEO Brenda Barnes was
taking a temporary medical leave, but did not initially disclose that
she had had a stroke.183
Although most of the media publicity regarding personal executive
information has occurred in the health context, disclosure issues can
extend far beyond executive health. Other potential subjects for disclosure include criminal investigations,184 financial trouble, divorce,185
extramarital affairs or other romantic liaisons, the purchase of
homes or other large luxury items, and the death or illness of a child
or other loved one.
Overall, the lesson from the existing law, its treatment by the
scholarship, and the way that it plays out in practice is that there
remains a good deal of confusion regarding whether, when, and under what circumstances corporations must reveal personal information about its executives to its shareholders. This confusion can
have a harmful impact on all the players involved as corporations,
executives, and shareholders lack certainty with regard to how to account for both privacy and disclosure.
178. See Horwich, supra note 11, at 829.
179. Id.; Adam Bryant, Time Warner’s Chief Takes Indefinite Leave, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 1992, at D1.
180. BRUCK, supra note 176, at 318.
181. Id. at 323.
182. Pimentel, supra note 99.
183. Michael Oneal, Sara Lee CEO Reveals She Had a Stroke: Brenda Barnes Recovering,
but No Other Details Given, CHI. TRIB., June 15, 2010, at C19.
184. For example, Chris Albrecht, the former chairman and CEO of HBO, was
forced to resign days after his 2007 arrest for domestic violence. See Phil
Rosenthal, HBO Plot Twist: Executive Quits After Alleged Assault, CHI. TRIB.
(May 10, 2007), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2007-05-10/business/0705091026_1_
chris-albrecht-hbo-independent-productions-ceo-richard-parsons; Jacques Steinberg & Bill
Carter, After Arrest, HBO Chief Takes Leave of Absence, N.Y. TIMES (May 9, 2007),
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/09/arts/television/09hbo.html?_r=0. The Los Angeles
Times exposed the fact that HBO had concealed prior domestic violence incidents,
raising the question of whether HBO should have revealed such information. See
Claudia Eller, HBO Chief Accused of Assault in 1991, L.A. TIMES (May 9, 2007),
http://articles.latimes.com/2007/may/09/business/fi-hbo9.
185. For example, Steve Wynn tried unsuccessfully to seal the details of his divorce in
order to keep it from shareholders. See Abril & Olazábal, supra note 11, at 1560.
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III. NEGOTIATION AND DISCLOSURE OF DISCLOSURE POLICIES
This Article proposes one possible solution for tackling the privacy-disclosure problem discussed in Part II. This proposal involves a
two-step process: 1) mandatory contracting between the executive
and the corporation regarding the plan for disclosure of the executive’s personal information, and then 2) mandatory disclosure of the
negotiated disclosure plan to the shareholders. This solution deliberately presents a hybrid between a pure contracting solution advocated by one school of thought in the larger corporate disclosure context
and a pure mandatory disclosure solution advocated by the opposing
school of thought. In borrowing aspects from both types of regimes,
the proposal takes advantage of beneficial features of both systems
for the purposes of tackling this particular problem.
A. Revealing Privacy Preferences via Contract
The first step of the proposal envisions that the law would require
executives and corporations to negotiate and then contract for an individualized policy for the disclosure of the executives’ personal information. As a result of that process, the goal is to implement a disclosure policy that adequately captures the executive’s privacy preferences while still accounting for the shareholders' disclosure interest. The outcome of the negotiation would therefore differ depending
on the degree to which an executive values his or her own privacy.
This mandatory contracting regime improves upon a traditional
mandatory disclosure regime, which fails to allow any flexibility or
opt-out to account for heterogeneous privacy preferences. If the existing studies in the consumer context are correct, even privacy guardians (what Westin calls privacy fundamentalists)186 are willing to part
with privacy, but for a very high cost.187 Through contract the parties
can decide whether it is “worth it” to pay the high cost by increasing
the compensation to the executive for the possible imposition on the
strong privacy preference. In many cases, the answer may be that it
is not worth that high cost, and the parties would end up with a private-disclosure policy in which a good deal of executive’s personal information will not be disclosed. For privacy pragmatists, the cost of
giving up privacy will be lower, although still not trivial. Privacy
pragmatists might be expected to have strong valuations for certain
aspects of privacy, but perhaps not others. As a result, some of these
executives would contract with the corporations for privacy-disclosure
policies that protect those aspects of their privacy that they value the
most highly, whereas other executives’ privacy valuations may be
within what the corporation is willing to pay.
186. See Westin, supra note 10.
187. See Hann et al., supra note 10, at 16.
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Even accounting for a wide variety of privacy preferences, it is
empirically possible that executive valuations of privacy always exceed the value of disclosure to the shareholders. Similarly, the exact
opposite is also possible: that the value of disclosure to the shareholders always exceeds the individual valuations of privacy. In the
former scenario, we would expect to see very privacy-protective disclosure policies, as it would not be worth it to the corporation to compensate the executive for a more disclosure-friendly policy. In the latter scenario, we would expect to see very disclosure-friendly disclosure policies and executives compensated for those policies, as it
would be worth it to the corporation to essentially purchase the privacy violation from the executive. If either of these two extreme scenarios represents reality, then the negotiation and contracting solution should still reach the appropriate result. Realistically, however,
it is unlikely for the equilibrium to exist at either extreme.188
This mandatory negotiation and contract process should reveal
individual privacy preferences and valuations better than alternative
institutional options. While individuals certainly do not have perfect
understandings of their own privacy preferences and valuations, the
data suggests that individuals do have discrete and heterogeneous
preferences.189 Even if the contracting process does not perfectly value
the individual executive’s privacy preferences, it can track individual
privacy preferences more closely than the alternatives: a court, legislature, or regulatory agency deciding or guessing how much the individual ought to or does value privacy.
In implementing this proposal, policymakers ought to consider
whether to place any substantive constraints upon the mandatory
contracting policy. One option would be for the law to impose no substantive restraints on the negotiation, and to let the parties develop
any disclosure policy whatsoever. A slight variation on this option
would be for the law to impose no additional constraints other than
those already in existence for protection of certain groups such as
pregnancy, race, disability, and age.190

188. Cf. Schwartz, supra note 64, at 41 (In the context of consumer personal health
information, “a socially optimal distribution of information is unlikely to exist at either
extreme on the privacy/disclosure continuum.”).
189. See supra Part II.
190. See, e.g., Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634
(2012); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012) (protecting
individuals from employment discrimination on the grounds of “race, color, religion, sex, or
national origin”); Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2012). Current
federal law has not been interpreted to protect against discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. See, e.g., Higgins v. New Balance Athletic Shoe, Inc., 194 F.3d 252, 259 (1st Cir.
1999). But see Victoria Schwartz, Title VII: A Shift from Sex to Relationships, 35 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 209 (2012) (arguing that this interpretation of the law is inconsistent with the
courts’ relational discrimination interpretation of other aspects of Title VII jurisprudence).
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This proposal offers an improvement upon a pure contract regime
that would use a traditional default rule, which the parties could
then contract around. At the outset, it is hard for policymakers to determine the efficient default rule. Even if the efficient default could
be determined, however, there are various reasons to believe that
parties might find themselves stuck in a default and unable to contract around that default.191 First, under even the most traditional
account, the drafting costs themselves may cause stickiness. Even
putting aside the traditional transaction costs of the simple legal fees
to draft the relevant provision, however, there are other possible reasons it may be difficult for the parties to opt out of the default rules.
In the context of discussing some potential benefits of mandatory disclosure rules, Easterbrook and Fischel recognize that under a pure
contract regime “no firm would have the appropriate incentives to
create the [most effective] formula for disclosure” of this information
in a way that allows shareholders to make useful comparisons.192 Additionally, Michael Klausner and Marcel Kahan have identified that
when contracting against a background of default rules, network externalities cause the choice of one firm’s contract to affect the value of
other firms’ contracts.193 In other words, developing an entirely new
disclosure policy from scratch may impose excessive transaction costs
on the parties, which individually they might not undertake, absent
the ability to coordinate in some way.194 Given these network externalities and the existence of heterogeneous privacy preferences, faced
with a default rule, corporations may suboptimally remain in the default policy because of an inability of those with nonmajoritarian privacy preferences to coordinate with others to efficiently design a different disclosure policy.195 An additional concern is that given that
corporate disclosure rules have historically been mandatory, a shift
to a pure default regime may not suffice as accrued network benefits may have created a significant bias against opting out of a particular default.196 This may be exacerbated by a signaling concern
resulting from opting out of a default.197 Under the signaling concern
191. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the Stickiness of Default Rules, 33
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006) (surveying the various theories for why defaults may be
sticky and claiming the problem is broader and more prevalent than recognized).
192. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 14, at 697.
193. See Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts,
81 VA. L. REV. 757, 775-84 (1995) (identifying such network externalities as judicial opinions interpreting contract terms, accumulation of business practices implementing the
term, and the legal services required to adopt the term); see also Marcel Kahan & Michael
Klausner, Standardization and Innovation in Corporate Contracting (or “The Economics of
Boilerplate”), 83 VA. L. REV. 713, 734-36 (1997).
194. See Klausner, supra note 193.
195. Id. at 832.
196. Cf. id. at 830-31 (noting the potential for this problem in corporate law more generally).
197. See Lisa Bernstein, Social Norms and Default Rules Analysis, 3 S. CAL. INTERDISC.
L.J. 59 (1993) (integrating default rules analysis and relational contract theory); Jason
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idea, parties do not opt out even when they would otherwise do so,
because of a concern that opting out from what is viewed as the “norm”
(as communicated by the existence of the default itself) by proposing
opt-out privacy policies “may in and of itself raise suspicion.”198
Therefore, to address some of these challenges of a pure default
system, this Article proposes that policymakers develop a menu of
possible disclosure options for the parties to choose from.199 A menu
approach would help reduce transaction costs,200 and increase a
standardized format that facilitates comparative use of what is disclosed.201 The purpose of the menu would be to allow executives with
heterogeneous privacy preferences to adopt disclosure policies tailored to their particular preferences202 while allowing for network externalities among executives with similar preferences. A menu approach can also help reduce the possibility of locking in a sub-optimal
equilibrium as menu options could be revised with time.203 This sort
of menu contract would also help solve the problem of negative signals from opting out because under a menu, parties do not have the
choice to remain silent.204 This sort of menu proposal is one example
of what Cass Sunstein calls a regime of active choice in which individuals are forced to decide among various options because the contract cannot be silent with regard to a particular term.205

Scott Johnston, Strategic Bargaining and the Economic Theory of Contract Default Rules,
100 YALE L.J. 615 (1990) (showing that it is more difficult for parties to bargain around
restrictive penalty default rules than around expansive default rules); Kathryn E. Spier,
Incomplete Contracts and Signalling, 23 RAND J. ECON. 432 (1992) (showing that contractual incompleteness is driven by asymmetric information). See generally Ben-Shahar &
Pottow, supra note 191.
198. Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 191, at 662-63.
199. The use of legally-created contract menus to aid parties with contracting in light
of various transaction costs was first developed in the bankruptcy context by Robert Rasmussen. Robert K. Rasmussen, Debtor’s Choice: A Menu Approach to Corporate Bankruptcy, 71 TEX. L. REV. 51, 100-21 (1992). Other scholars subsequently extended this insight to
other contexts. See, e.g., Ian Ayres, Menus Matter, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 3 (2006); Ian Ayres &
Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules,
101 YALE L.J. 729, 739-41 (1992); Douglas G. Baird & M. Todd Henderson, Other People’s
Money, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1309, 1340-42 (2008); Klausner, supra note 193, at 839-41;
Yair Listokin, What Do Corporate Default Rules and Menus Do? An Empirical Examination,
6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 279 (2009).
200. Similar strategies have been proposed in other contexts. See Froomkin, supra note
69, at 1505 (noting that in the consumer context it can be helpful to lower the transaction
costs of modifying standard form contracts to undercut challenges with contracting, given
consumer behavior).
201. Cf. Rasmussen, supra note 199, at 66-67 (noting that a menu of options in the
bankruptcy context helps make communication to third parties easier).
202. Cf. id. at 54 (noting that heterogeneity in firms suggests the use of a menu approach
for bankruptcy).
203. Klausner, supra note 193, at 840.
204. See Ayres & Gertner, supra note 199, at 739 n.33.
205. Sunstein, supra note 94, at 21.
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In developing the precise contours of the menu of options, policymakers must consider whether executives and shareholders are likely to want to treat disclosure of certain categories of information differently than other categories of information. In making these menu
design choices, policymakers must balance having an optimal disclosure policy for executives with heterogeneous preferences among different dimensions, against the information costs of learning about
different options. At some point, excessive options and choices reduce
the usability both for the parties doing the contracting, and for the
shareholders who need to use the disclosure policy.
One possible division worth consideration for inclusion on the
menu is a distinction between disclosures of personal information
exclusively about the executive, and disclosures that involve the privacy of a third party such as a spouse or child. Additionally, the corporation and executive by means of the menu contract may wish to
reach different disclosure policies for all personal health information,
all family-related information, and all other information. The menu
should not go so far as to distinguish between very specific information, such as a policy agreement to disclose liver cancer, but not
prostate cancer, as that level of detail is unlikely to be linked to different privacy preferences, but rather to knowledge of underlying information. Additionally, the contract may wish to distinguish between personal information that currently has an impact on the executive, and personal information that has some probability of having
an impact on the executive in the future. Because the latter category
involves various layers of probabilities, the menu options can usefully
consider disclosure separately for each category. Finally, the contract
should specify the detail of disclosure required. For example, a more
privacy-protective policy may require that the corporation disclose
the fact of impairment, but not the reason for the impairment. A
more disclosure-leaning solution would also require disclosure of the
reason for the impairment.
Overall, development of such a menu form would help the parties
think through the different options that should be resolved by the
disclosure policy. Parties would have the option to negotiate for no
disclosure whatsoever for certain or all categories of personal information, for example, information involving third parties. These questions could be thought through systematically and incorporated into
a relatively simple form that could help reduce transaction costs and
avoid the need for the parties to think through all the options from
scratch each time; by being forced to fill in the blanks, parties would
actively negotiate for the privacy and disclosure preferences for various types of information. Regardless of the exact form of the negotiated
contract, or the extent to which options are limited or infinite, the im-
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portant new idea is that the executive would have the ability to reveal
individualized privacy preferences in the course of those negotiations.206
The negotiation and contract process should take place at the beginning of the executive relationship in order to optimize the process.207 By negotiating and contracting for the privacy policy at the
time of hiring or promotion to the executive position, the parties are
already engaged in negotiations regarding various complex terms of
employment.208 This further reduces the marginal transactional costs
that results from contracting as compared to those for parties not already at the bargaining table. Furthermore, limiting the negotiation
to the beginning of the relationship increases the probability that the
executive is acting primarily based on knowledge of his or her overall
privacy preferences, rather than knowledge of an existing personal
fact, which the executive wishes to keep private. By having upfront
negotiation and contracting it is still possible that a privacyprotective policy means that the executive has something to hide, but
it is equally possible that it just means that the executive is a private
person.209 Because shareholders cannot distinguish between the two
options, there is a reduced concern of unraveling and the contract
signaling to shareholders the very sort of information that the privacy-disclosure policy is designed to keep private.210
Relatedly, corporations and executives should not be permitted to
renegotiate the disclosure policy on an ad hoc basis. For example, if
206. See Murphy, supra note 62, at 2393 (“In the absence of contract, [a privacy] preference is often difficult to determine.”).
207. As with other types of disclosure, the timing of the actual disclosure should also be
carefully considered in order to minimize strategic timing of disclosures to maximize
performance-based compensation. See Charles M. Yablon & Jennifer Hill, Timing Corporate Disclosures to Maximize Performance-Based Remuneration: A Case of Misaligned
Incentives?, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 83, 87-88 (2000) (explaining that managers’ traditional discretion over the timing of corporate disclosures allows them to maximize their
own performance-based compensation).
208. See Omari Scott Simmons, Taking the Blue Pill: The Imponderable Impact of Executive Compensation Reform, 62 SMU L. REV. 299, 310-11 (2009) (describing the executive
pay decision as part of the decision to hire a CEO, in which boards choose between various
candidates with varying traits and competencies and negotiate on complicated aspects of
executive compensation).
209. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY
AND THE LAW 95 (1994) (“Unraveling may not occur (or will not be complete) if there is a
chance that a player has never acquired the relevant information. In such a case, one will
not be able to tell whether players are silent because they do not have the relevant information or because they have the information but do not wish to reveal it.”).
210. See Scott R. Peppet, Unraveling Privacy: The Personal Prospectus and the Threat
of a Full-Disclosure Future, 105 NW. U. L. REV. 1153, 1195 (2011) (noting that economic
theory cannot predict the point at which privacy’s unraveling may be less than complete,
but “in some instances the equilibrium may allow some market participants with less than
ideal information to keep that information private”); see also Verrechia, supra note 12, at
142 (noting that uncertainty may be a rationale for the withholding of information because
there is the possibility that the information is bad, or because the information in question
has yet to arrive).
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the executive and corporation were permitted to spontaneously renegotiate for a more privacy-protective policy, then shareholders
would immediately assume that the policy change means that the
executive has something to hide.211 This would undermine the very
purpose of negotiating for a disclosure policy.
On the other hand, policymakers may wish to consider permitting
renegotiation of the disclosure policy at a pre-determined interval.
Just as in the health insurance context, in which individuals are
permitted to change their insurance levels during a pre-determined
open enrollment window, a similar option may be possible, for example allowing for renegotiation after five or ten years. This can help
address the problem that individual privacy preferences may change
over time.212 Borrowing further from the insurance context, perhaps a
pre-existing condition type of model can help avoid the concern that
what is actually being protected in the revised policy is a new personal problem rather than new privacy preferences. For example, an
executive who has gone through a particular health challenge may
realize that as a result his or her privacy preferences have shifted in
favor of privacy. Therefore, when the “open enrollment” window
comes along, the executive wishes to amend the disclosure policy in
favor of disclosing less private information. The pre-existing condition idea would mean that the executive’s existing health condition,
or directly related conditions would continue to be disclosed under
the former policy, but new and unrelated information could be disclosed at the reduced level in the new policy.
Policymakers must also decide which set of executives would negotiate a disclosure policy with the corporation. The most straightforward possibility is to limit the regime to the chief executive officer.
This would be the most easy to administer, as each corporation would

211. This is a version of the game-theoretic unraveling effect, which posits that “[i]n a
world of verifiable information and low-cost signaling,” self-interested actors will be forced
to disclose fully their personal information for economic gain, and those who refuse to do so
“are assumed to be withholding negative information and therefore stigmatized and penalized.” Peppet, supra note 210, at 1156; see also BAIRD, GERTNER & PICKER, supra note 209,
at 95-98; Richard A. Posner, Privacy, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS
AND THE LAW 103, 107 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
212. Whether individual privacy preferences actually do change over time is an empirical question worth exploring further. See Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV.
L. REV. 1399, 1454 (2005) (recognizing the policy challenges posed because people’s preferences may change over time); see also Sunstein, supra note 94, at 23 (pointing out that
individual preferences may vary from year to year). I agree with Lior Strahilevitz and Ariel
Porat’s intuition that at least with regard to privacy preferences, these sorts of values tend
to be largely stable once people reach adulthood as they are largely driven by personality
characteristics and values. See Ariel Porat & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Personalizing Default
Rules and Disclosure with Big Data 42 (Coase-Sandor Inst. for Law & Econ., Working Paper No. 634 (2d Series), 2013). Nonetheless, like Strahilevitz and Porat, this proposal recognizes that people sometimes do change in ways that can shift their privacy preferences
and allows for some accommodation of that possibility. See id.
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only have to engage in a single negotiation, and shareholders would
only have to keep track of a single policy. On the other hand, limiting
the proposal to the CEO means that other high-level executives
would not be able to negotiate for disclosure policies that adequately
reflect their own privacy preferences.
An alternative option is to develop a definition of a covered person
based on such considerations as indispensability to the company. For
example, one practitioner proposes defining the covered person as
a director of, employee of or independent contractor retained by
the [corporation] who performs functions on behalf of or for the
[corporation] that are not, at the time of the [disclosure decision],
provided to the [corporation] by any other person, are fundamental
to the financial performance of the [corporation] and, in the good
faith judgment of the [corporation], could not be performed by anyone currently employed by or retained by the [corporation.]213

This particular language was designed as “deliberately narrow” and
covers very few executives, but a different definition could be drafted,
which covers more executives.
The Article proposes a possible alternative that builds upon features of the existing disclosure regime. The law already requires that
corporations provide its shareholders with full compensation information for the CEO and the four most highly compensated executive
officers by means of a summary compensation table.214 Therefore, in a
world in which that sort of disclosure already exists, extending the
negotiation and contract process to that same set of executives makes
sense to the extent that executive compensation can be viewed as a
general approximation for how vital that executive is to the corporation, and therefore a decent proxy for the set of executives for whom
shareholders have a legitimate disclosure interest. This also makes
sense conceptually to the extent that the privacy-disclosure policy
can be viewed as a piece of the compensation puzzle, as corporations
may have to increase compensation to the executive if they wish to
decrease the amount of privacy maintained by the executive and vice
versa. Therefore, the entire picture of compensation can be presented
if the negotiation and contract is limited to those executives for whom
full compensation disclosure is already provided to shareholders.
B. Revealing Disclosure Preferences via Disclosure
The second step of the proposal would require the corporation to
disclose the precise disclosure policy agreed upon with the executive
to its shareholders. This necessarily means that while the precise
process of the negotiation would not be proscribed by the law, the

213. Horwich, supra note 11, at 868.
214. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402 (2012).
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law would mandate the existence of the final product from that
process—namely, the disclosure policy itself.
Disclosing the disclosure policy to the shareholders helps keep the
interest of the corporation and the interests of the shareholders more
closely aligned with regard to the shareholders’ preferences for disclosure, in order to help avoid a possible agency problem. It is true
that alignment is not perfect, given that shareholders do not negotiate directly with the executive, but the corporation is more likely to
align its bargaining position over time with the shareholders if it is
required to disclose the agreed-upon policy to the shareholders. If the
corporation fails to properly represent the shareholders position with
regard to disclosure, then the shareholders can move their capital to
a corporation that more accurately reflects their disclosure desires
and views. For example, suppose that a particular executive and corporation bargain for a privacy policy that is fairly protective of privacy. The policy states that the corporation will not disclose personal
information about the executive unless it is currently substantially
impacting his or her ability to do his or her job, and even then will
only disclose the fact of the situation, not the underlying personal
facts. The corporation will then have to disclose this nondisclosure
policy to its shareholders. If this minimal disclosure is not satisfactory to shareholders, then the market should respond by lowering the
price of the corporation's stock in response to such a policy. In the
long run then, the market will help inform and measure the strength
of shareholder preferences for disclosure.
In addition to revealing shareholder disclosure preferences, disclosing the nondisclosure policy to the shareholders helps clarify the
expectations of everyone involved regarding the circumstances under
which disclosure will occur. Under the current system, shareholders
do not know when and under what circumstances corporations will
disclose information about executives to the shareholders. Additional
clarity on this front helps with decisionmaking for everyone involved.
This second step also provides the second half of the insurance
that corporations abide by the disclosed disclosure policy by taking
advantage of the litigious nature of American society. Thinking about
the example of Steve Jobs, if Steve Jobs and Apple had negotiated at
the outset for a particular disclosure policy, then all parties involved
would have had clear expectations regarding what would need to be
disclosed. Shareholders would have known that Apple would either
never disclose personal information about Jobs, would always disclose personal information about Jobs, or would disclose personal information about Jobs only given certain contractually-identified circumstances. If Apple had disclosed information about Jobs that it
had contractually promised not to disclose, then Jobs himself would
have had a cause of action. Suppose on the other hand (as in fact was
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the case) that Apple did not disclose any of the health issues that
Jobs was having until the very end when it was revealed that he was
terminally ill with cancer. The question from the perspective of the
shareholder would be whether that disclosure was consistent with
Apple’s declared disclosure policy. If Apple’s behavior was inconsistent with a good faith compliance with the disclosure policy, then
it would be fairly straightforward for a shareholder to bring such a
suit. This is only possible, however, by mandating disclosure of the
disclosure policy and giving the shareholders a clear expectation of
disclosure and a correlated cause of action. It might also make sense
to give the SEC the power to bring a case for violation of a disclosed
nondisclosure policy in order to increase pressure on corporations to
abide by the agreed-upon policies.
Scholars have also recognized that disclosure fails if the target of
the disclosure cannot understand or process the information.215 The
menu approach proposed above to help facilitate contracting can also
help with usability/readability. At a minimum, by implementing a
standard format and common vocabulary across different disclosure
policies, such menu contracts would allow shareholders to do direct
comparison of various corporate disclosure policies.216 Similarly, the
actual language of the menu options can be designed to maximize
completeness of disclosure as well as comprehensibility by the shareholders. Additionally, all of this information could be presented on
the summary compensation table, which currently serves as a single
location where all top executive compensation is presented. At the
bottom of each column of information for a particular executive, corporations could include electronic links or simple attachments to the
executive’s summary compensation information.
In the long run, it would then be possible to design easy software
tools to help shareholders search for corporations that meet their
minimal requirements. For example, a shareholder could communicate to his or her broker, or via software, that he or she is only willing to purchase a stock with a certain minimum level of disclosure
across the various categories. This would prevent the need for shareholders to always read the actual nondisclosure policy, while still accomplishing the goal of having shareholders’ preferences reflected in
215. See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 650-51, 711 (2011).
216. See Xinguang Sheng & Lorrie Faith Cranor, An Evaluation of the Effect of US
Financial Privacy Legislation Through the Analysis of Privacy Policies, 2 ISJLP 943, 975
(2006) (noting that the Gramm-Leach Bliley Act requirement that financial institutions
provide notice of privacy policies to customers has resulted in helpful standard format and
common vocabulary, while recognizing its many failures); see also Easterbrook & Fischel,
supra note 14, at 700-01 (noting the one of the primary benefits of mandatory disclosure is
the use of a standard format and time of disclosure, which increases the comparative value
of what is disclosed and reduces the costs of disclosure).
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the policies. At the same time the menu contract would be relatively
straightforward and would not resemble the sort of lengthy legalese
privacy policies that consumers receive and disregard all the time,217
such that a shareholder who did choose to read the policy should be
able to understand it with relative ease.
C. Potential Secondary Benefits
Furthermore, it is possible that this entire regime would not only
better reflect existing privacy and disclosure preferences, but could
also change social behavior regarding privacy. In advocating for a
contractual approach to online interpersonal privacy, Patricia
Sánchez Abril notes that the contractual system could allow individuals to communicate expectations of privacy to each other and potentially “recontextualiz[e] the online social space as one where people
[have the option to] value privacy.”218 Abril views contract as having
the power to both express and create social norms and to combat the
“anything goes” environment that generally exists when it comes to
privacy.219 If Abril is correct, then allowing individual executives to
negotiate for privacy-disclosure policies can create a social norm in
which it is acceptable to maintain some aspects of one’s life private
even if one chooses to be a corporate executive.220
This ability to contract for increased privacy, and the shift in
norms that may accompany it, could have a beneficial impact on the
prevalence of women and minorities in corporate positions. It is widely recognized that women and minorities are underrepresented
as executives of publically traded corporations.221 A wide variety of
217. See Sheng & Cranor, supra note 216, at 962 (explaining that financial institution
privacy policies are easier to read post-Gramm-Leach Bliley Act, but remain difficult
to comprehend).
218. Abril, supra note 71, at 694.
219. Id. at 689, 719.
220. A shift in norms may also reduce a potential unraveling effect. See Peppet, supra
note 210, at 1196 (“To the extent that informal norms develop against disclosure, privacy
may not unravel completely.”).
221. The Department of Labor’s Glass Ceiling Commission of 1991 found that women
accounted for only 6.6% of executives and minorities only 2.6%. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, A
REPORT ON THE GLASS CEILING INITIATIVE 6 (1991). Although those numbers have improved somewhat over the years, women still hold only 3% of top officer posts (CEO, COO,
President, Chair, Vice Chair, and Executive Vice President), those positions that are most
likely to have a privacy impact, and in 2002, only 1.8% of CEOs of Fortune 500 companies
were women. See David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Understanding Affirmative Action, 23 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 921, 966-67 (1996) (stating that white men occupied 97% of top management positions in America's 1500 largest companies); see also Women in Business: Helping
Women Get to the Top, ECONOMIST (July 21, 2005), http://www.economist.com/node/4198363
(noting that while women account for nearly half of the global work force, they account for
very few positions in senior management at large corporations; “For every ten men in the
executive suite there is one woman, a ratio that has changed little since the term ‘the glass
ceiling’ was coined two decades ago to describe the barrier that allows women to see the top
of the corporate ladder, but seems to stop them from reaching it. Despite much discussion,
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theories have been offered to help explain this continued glass ceiling, and undoubtedly there are a number of complex factors at
play.222 One possibility worth exploring in future work is whether
privacy preferences play a role in this disparity. There are some reasons to believe that women and minorities may be more privacyprotective than white men.223 Perhaps, then, among the complex factors involved in a world in which executives cannot contract for privacy and the ability to guarantee individual privacy is uncertain,
women and minorities are less likely to pursue the top-level corporate positions, in which their privacy is likely to be compromised.
Although this remains speculative, the impact of privacy concerns on
women and minorities’ abilities to reach top executive positions is
worth further consideration.
D. Comparisons with a Sorting Regime
A contract-based regime like the one proposed necessarily has
transaction costs associated with the contracting process itself. Although the contractual menu design of the proposal deliberately seeks to
minimize those contracting costs, they cannot be eliminated entirely.
In other contexts in which there are heterogeneous preferences,
the conventional response is to suggest that individuals sort themselves based on their heterogeneous preferences.224 Therefore, it is
worth considering whether a similar sorting regime might make
sense for the heterogeneous privacy preferences faced by corporations
for their executives. It might be possible to design a system in which
corporations would unilaterally decide on their disclosure policies.
Executives could then sort themselves into the corporation whose
disclosure policy best fits their privacy preferences.
Although such a regime is possible, as with any sorting solution,225
it too would have associated costs. First of all, there are reasons to be
particularly concerned as to whether sorting would work efficiently
and efforts by both women’s and business groups to break that barrier down, the world’s
biggest companies are still almost exclusively run by men . . . .”). The picture is even bleaker for minorities. See Oppenheimer, supra, at 967-68.
222. See, e.g., Diane L. Bridge, The Glass Ceiling and Sexual Stereotyping: Historical
and Legal Perspectives of Women in the Workplace, 4 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 581 (1997) (focusing on the challenges that the corporate glass ceiling raises for women in the workplace).
223. See generally Mary J. Culnan & Pamela K. Armstrong, Information Privacy Concerns, Procedural Fairness, and Impersonal Trust: An Empirical Investigation, 10 ORG. SCI.
104, 110 (1999) (noting that some surveys indicate that less dominant groups, such as minorities and women, may have the greatest privacy concerns).
224. See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE, FISCAL SYSTEMS 299 (1969) (suggesting that “it
is efficient for people with similar tastes in social goods to reside together”); see also
Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 422 (1956)
(making a similar point for public goods).
225. See Fennel, supra note 212, at 1455-56 (recognizing the limits and concerns
presented by sorting in the housing context).
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in the market for corporate executives. Unlike housing, in which
there are generally properties available in different neighborhoods at
any given moment, high-level executive positions are extremely rare,
especially at a given moment. Therefore, even if they desired to do so,
executives might not be able to sort among corporations with various
disclosure policies, but would often be faced with an all-or-nothing
proposition. Second, as with other complex decisions,226 executives
make decisions based on a multitude of factors, such that privacy
would be bundled with numerous other relevant considerations. This
would also limit the ability of executives to adequately sort based on
privacy preferences.
Finally, there might be additional costs associated with such sorting even if it did occur. For example, a lower-level executive with experience in a particular company might otherwise be promoted within that corporation to a high-level executive position (sufficiently
high to necessitate disclosure). If that executive’s privacy preferences
did not match that corporation’s disclosure policy, the executive
might be forced to sort away to a different corporation, even though
the executive’s institutional knowledge would mean it would ordinarily
be more efficient for the executive to remain within the original company. A contract-based solution would allow the corporation to retain
that executive by negotiating an individualized disclosure policy.
IV. APPLICABILITY OF THE PROPOSAL
Allowing corporations and executives to contract for a tailored
nondisclosure policy in combination with mandating disclosure of
that nondisclosure policy would better address the privacy-disclosure
balancing problem than traditional legal solutions. This section anticipates questions regarding the extent to which this conclusion is generalizable to other related situations, and considers the circumstances under which disclosure of nondisclosure policies might work as a
feasible substitute for disclosure of underlying facts.
Although similar privacy-disclosure problems occur in many contexts, at the outset, contracting only makes sense when both parties
have sufficient bargaining power to believe that the contract can adequately reflect the interests of both parties. Therefore, unlike corporate executives, a similar model would likely not make sense in an
ordinary employment contract for ordinary employees who lack such
bargaining power. Furthermore, contracting only makes sense where
there is a market with sophisticated parties who can act on the disclosed disclosure policies. In the context of corporate executives, institutional investors and other sophisticated shareholders play that role,
leading to a closer approximation of an efficient market assumption.
226. See id. at 1456 (making this point for the decision to buy a home).
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In other contexts where this sort of problem arises, such as a few
mentioned below, other types of solutions need to be developed.
A. Distinguishing the Consumer Context
The idea of using disclosure of disclosure policies does exist in other areas involving privacy problems, although in a very different way.
For example, Michael Froomkin proposes that “all sites that collect
personal data [be] required to disclose what they collect and what
they do with it.”227 This is the inverse of the proposal presented in
this Article. In Froomkin’s scenario, the question being answered by
the disclosure policy is what information will be collected and when
that information will be disclosed to others, where such disclosure is
mostly bad from the consumer’s perspective. In the scenario here, the
point of disclosure of the disclosure policy is actually disclosure of nondisclosure—or informing shareholders what information will not be
disclosed where disclosure is viewed as largely positive from the shareholders’ perspective. Despite these differences, both ideas use similar
mechanisms combining legislation, market forces, and the litigiousness
of Americans to attempt to strike a proper balance by making it an
actionable offense to violate a posted privacy/disclosure policy.228
Furthermore, there are reasons to believe that disclosure of the
applicable disclosure policy may work better in the corporate executive disclosure scenario than in the consumer context.229 There are
concerns with allowing individual consumers to negotiate the level of
privacy or disclosure that they desire due to various market imperfections.230 Many of these concerns, however, do not apply to negotiations between sophisticated executives and corporations. Two of the
main concerns with relying upon a privacy market in the consumer
context—lack of bargaining power and lack of privity of contract—have
been eliminated in the executive context. Unlike consumers or ordinary employees, executives typically have plenty of bargaining power
and leverage, and are therefore in a position to fairly contract for
their desired terms. Additionally, the corporations and executives are

227. Froomkin, supra note 69, at 1528.
228. See id.
229. Even in the consumer context, proponents of contracting for privacy models contend that computer technology will allow individuals to delegate individualized negotiations over disclosure and use of personal information to intelligent software agents. See,
e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, 1 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 64 (1999)
(describing P3P, “a standard for negotiating protocols on the web,” which could decide
whether a particular website’s privacy practices match the user’s preferences). But see
Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1294-01
(2000) (expressing concern with such solutions).
230. See Schwartz, supra note 64, at 41 (noting that various market imperfections caution against simply letting individuals negotiate the level of privacy or disclosure that they
desire in the context of consumer personal health care data).
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already at the bargaining table negotiating various aspects of the
employment arrangement, so there is no concern with a lack of privity.
There is also a concern in the consumer context with the lack of
knowledge on the part of consumers regarding the treatment of personal data. For example, in the medical privacy context, Paul
Schwartz notes that there are three factors contributing to the failure
of the privacy market: (1) lack of knowledge regarding the treatment
of personal data; (2) an agency problem; and (3) a collective action
problem.231 The lack-of-knowledge concern would be ameliorated in
the executive context by using the very requirement of negotiating
for a disclosure policy as a means of making executives fully aware of
the possibility of disclosure of their personal information. As opposed
to the shallow consent process in the medical context, which relies on
blanket patient release forms,232 the proposal here requires active
negotiation of an individualized policy, therefore raising issues of
awareness, informed consent, and possible compensation for disclosure of personal information.233
With regard to the potential agency problem identified by Schwartz
in the medical context, here too the shareholders’ disclosure interest is
imperfectly represented by the corporation at the negotiation table.234
The disclosure of the nondisclosure policy is an attempt to minimize
the agency problem by providing a mechanism to hold corporations
accountable to the extent that disclosure policies vastly diverge from
the shareholder preferences.
Finally, in the consumer context there is a collective action problem because “[a]s members of large consumer blocks, individuals may
have difficulty finding effective ways to express collectively their relative preferences for privacy.”235 The solution offered here is precisely
designed to help executives express their respective privacy preferences relatively cheaply, which is made possible by the fact that the
parties already have contractual privity. Therefore, many of the concerns in the consumer context with contracting for and adopting a
disclosure of the relevant disclosure policies can be avoided in the
corporate executive context.
B. Distinguishing the Political Context
Perhaps the most obvious contender for an analogous situation is
the question of how to treat the disclosure of private information
231. Id. at 47.
232. See id. at 49.
233. See also Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 215, at 667-79 (describing the challenges with uninformed consent to disclosure).
234. See Schwartz, supra note 64, at 50 (describing the agency problem in the health
context due to a conflict of interest between the employer and the employee).
235. Id.
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about political candidates and elected officials.236 Currently no law
requires political candidates or elected officials to disclose information about their health.237 Many candidates do decide to voluntarily release information about their physical health, although others
have outright lied about their health status.238 There are, however,
state and federal election commission rules that require candidates
for office to make various types of financial disclosures.239
Numerous similarities exist between the political disclosure context and the executive disclosure context. Just as shareholders have a
legitimate interest in knowing information that could impact the performance of corporate executives, voters and citizens have a legitimate interest in knowing information that could impact the performance of elected officials.240 Additionally, both executives and political candidates necessarily give up some rights to privacy as a result
of their decision to pursue their careers of choice, although certainly
neither group entirely gives up all privacy rights.241 Similarly, there
have been concerns expressed that a perceived lack of strong candidates for elected office is a direct result of the invasion of privacy that
comes along with running for office.242 Scholars have recognized that
increasing the potential for maintaining some privacy would mitigate
these high costs of running for public office, resulting in an increase
in the pool of qualified candidates, and perhaps also a higher degree
of excellence in government.243 In other words, there is a concern that
if privacy preferences are heterogeneous, that limitation of the pool of
politicians to those with very low privacy preferences impacts the
quality of candidates.
236. See Teneille R. Brown, Double Helix, Double Standards: Private Matters and Public People, 11 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 295 (2008) (looking at disclosure of a presidential
candidate’s health information through the lens of disclosure of genetic testing results);
René Reyes, Do Even Presidents Have Private Lives?, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 477 (2008)
(arguing for a limited executive privacy independent of executive privilege).
237. Brown, supra note 236, at 304.
238. Id.
239. Id. at 332-35.
240. Id. at 298 (noting that Americans deserve information to help them determine if
political candidates “are up for the enormous challenges and responsibilities” of elected office).
241. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321 (1997) (holding that a Georgia state law
that required candidates for high public office to pass a drug test was unconstitutional, but
exposing reduced privacy expectations of candidates for public office).
242. See Reyes, supra note 236, at 481 (pointing out that qualified individuals may be
unwilling to face the loss of privacy and the sense of personhood and freedom that comes
from privacy that is lost when running for government office, regardless of whether they
have damaging or embarrassing facts to hide).
243. Id.; Ruth Gavison, Privacy and the Limits of Law, 89 YALE L.J. 421, 456 (1980).
But see Alan Rubel, Claims to Privacy and the Distributed Value View, 44 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 921, 928-29 (2007) (recognizing the potential legitimacy of the argument that lack of
privacy may decrease the pool of people from which officials are drawn, thus decreasing
opportunities for good governance, but concluding that the goal of having the best qualified
people hold office is outweighed by other justifications for democratic processes, including
obtaining the consent of the governed, which requires access to information).
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Furthermore, in a world in which the government and its elected
officials increasingly make policies about the privacy of ordinary citizens, there may be a social harm to the privacy of all individuals that
occurs when politicians are limited to the portion of the population
who do not highly value privacy. Similar to the concern about corporate executives, who also make a good deal of privacy policy,244 having
elected officials solely from a self-selected pool of low-privacy individuals may result in a lesser priority on privacy in general, as a result
of a lack of understanding of “what the privacy fuss is all about.”245
Despite all of these similarities in the problem, key differences
prevent any recommended applicability of the solution proposed
above to candidates for elected office. The political context is missing
some notable features necessary to make the solution work in the
corporate context. One major difference is that the disclosure of personal information that could impact the performance of elected officials is more important during the campaign, when voters need to
make an informed decision, than during the term of office itself. Unlike shareholders, who can continue to buy and sell stock at any time
and therefore need continuous information, voters do not continuously vote on the performance of elected officials outside of the context of
elections. This suggests that the timing of the solution needs to be
different, and the treatment of personal information about candidates for office (some of whom may currently be in office) should be
different from personal information about already-elected officials.
A corollary of this difference is that the mechanisms involved in
getting candidates elected greatly differ from the mechanisms involved in hiring an executive. Most importantly, there is no immediate parallel to the negotiation process in which the executive and
corporation negotiate over various aspects of compensation. Instead,
candidates for elected office run for office knowing in advance the
terms of the job for which they are running. The details of that job
are non-negotiable. Furthermore, much of the disclosure of information results from media scrutiny and the unraveling effects of disclosure by other candidates, rather than any legal requirement for
disclosure. For example, during the 2012 U.S. presidential election
Mitt Romney found himself forced to reveal some aspects of his tax
returns after repeated calls by other candidates for him to do so.246
244. See supra Part II.C.3.
245. See Westin, supra note 10 (explaining that the 20% of the population falling within the privacy unconcerned group fails to recognize “what the ‘privacy fuss’ is all about”).
This theme of the societal implications of having both corporate executives and politicians
drawn from a privacy-unconcerned subset of the population will be explored further in
future scholarship.
246. See Todd Wallack, Romney’s Tax Returns Show Income of $20.9m Last Year,
BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 24, 2012), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/nation/2012/01/24/
mitt-romney-earned-million/mN98vq9Z9xJlCCj8Pl6xHN/story.html.
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In view of these differences, any attempt to draw lessons from the
executive and privacy balancing solution offered in this Article must
properly take into account the particular challenges of the political
context. This is not a one-size-fits-all proposal. The proposal presented in this Article offers one way of addressing one particular incarnation of a privacy-disclosure problem by taking advantage of features
of the corporate disclosure system: (1) sophisticated parties who can
engage in informed contract negotiation; (2) existing sophisticated
investors who have the time and resources to update the market in
light of new information; (3) mechanisms and institutions for pricing
complex information; and (4) empowered shareholders who have
proven themselves willing to sue in order to enforce the disclosure
system. Any similar proposal in the political context would have to
take advantage of existing institutions in the political realm, which
are very different from the institutions and mechanisms in the corporate context. For example, rather than mandating some sort of specific regulated disclosure before a candidate could receive federal
matching funds for his or her campaign, as others have proposed,247
the law could mandate that candidates disclose their nondisclosure
policy in order to receive federal matching funds for the campaign.
Then if the candidate failed to disclose promised information, or,
more importantly, flat out lied about promised information, the remedy would be that the candidate be forced to return those funds,
which were conditioned on good faith compliance with an agreed-to
disclosure policy. It is true that the increased likelihood of an unraveling effect in the politician arena might require high levels of disclosure; however, at the very least this would create certainty for everyone involved with regard to disclosure, and offer a remedy in response to the clear problem of candidates lying about information.
Furthermore, this system would allow candidates to agree to protect
the privacy of children or other family members, as there might be
wider agreement that the children did not choose to enter the public
sphere. Alternatively, policymakers could consider leveraging the political party system and the possibility of contracts with those parties
to create the sort of balance of privacy and disclosure made possible
in the executive context by virtue of the contract relationship.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has suggested that new solutions are needed for the
disclosure of personal information about corporate executives. The
status quo lacks clarity, fails to account for both privacy and disclosure interests, and removes the possibility for executives to opt

247. See Brown, supra note 236, at 361.
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out of the regime to tailor a disclosure policy that better fits their
privacy preferences.
As one possible solution for addressing the competing interests of
privacy and disclosure, policymakers should supply menus of optional
disclosure policies. Executives and corporations should contract for
the particular disclosure policy that would apply to that executive’s
personal information. The corporation should then be required to disclose the disclosure policy to the shareholders. This combination would
improve upon the status quo by increasing clarity, while allowing
for differences in policies that can reflect heterogeneity in executive
privacy preferences.
Returning for illustrative purposes to the most salient example of
the problem, despite his notoriety, by all accounts Steve Jobs was an
extremely private individual even prior to his diagnosis. Consequently, under the proposed disclosure-of-disclosure-polices regime, Jobs
would likely have contracted for a disclosure policy that would have
protected a fair amount of his personal information from disclosure.
Thus, when he became sick, Apple would not have needed to agonize
over whether to disclose his information. It could have consulted the
applicable disclosure policy as to whether health information about
Jobs needed to be disclosed. Similarly, shareholders would have already known that Jobs had a disclosure policy in which certain types
of information would not be disclosed. All parties would have had far
clearer expectations, and Jobs’ privacy preferences could have been
accommodated. This illustrates the way the proposed solution should
work not only for Jobs, but also for less famous executives and corporations facing the privacy-disclosure problem.
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